Revisiting the Fall of Dhaka

Fifty years ago on 16 December, Pakistan’s eastern wing became Bangladesh, an independent nation, following a bloody violence. It was indeed a great tragedy which definitely demanded a thorough investigation and accordingly the Hamoodur Rahman Commission was set up to find out the causes of the fall of Dhaka. Unfortunately, successive governments in Pakistan never released the report submitted by the Commission that probed the debacle. Though an honest national debate is still pending on the circumstances which resulted in the fall of East Pakistan, it’s time to recall some factual incidents.

Many, now in their sixties, may still remember watching on PTV and seeing Pakistan Peoples Party Chairperson and then Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto giving a fiery speech at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) chamber which was followed by him tearing and throwing away some papers in rage and walking out on December 15 1971, a day ahead of the fall of Dhaka. Bhutto, in capacity as Foreign Minister, was attending the UNSC meeting specially convened to resolve the crisis in the then East Pakistan. His emotional speech and tearing of the famous “Polish Resolution” and dramatic exit from the Chamber is indeed a part of history. Bhutto’s followers appreciated the act while his detractors criticised.

In his highly charged speech Bhutto said: “so what if Dhaka falls? So what if the whole of East Pakistan falls? So what if the whole of West Pakistan falls? We will build a new Pakistan. We will build a better Pakistan… I am talking as the authentic leader of the people of West Pakistan who elected me at the polls in a more impressive victory than the victory of Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan, but he did not take cognisance of it… Why should I waste my time here, I will go back to my country and fight. We will fight for a thousand years… India is intoxicated today with its military successes… so you will see… this is the beginning of the road. Today… I am leaving your Security Council. I find it disgraceful to my person and my country to remain here a moment longer… legalise aggression, I will not be a party to it. …You can take your Security Council. Here you are. I am going.”

Now what was the polish resolution? It was a draft resolution presented by Poland with Russian support, which demanded release of Awami League Shiekh President Mujibur Rahman, a peaceful transfer of power to the lawfully elected representatives – Rahman won 167 seats, while Bhutto won 86 – and the arrangement of talks between India and Pakistan for withdrawal of troops from the Western wing. If the Resolution tabled by Poland was agreed to not a single prisoner of war nor an inch of territory would have been held by either side, there probably would have been no surrender by Pakistan’s forces to the Indian Command and there would have been no Simla Agreement, either.

Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, one of the most respected politicians of Pakistan in his well-received memoirs, ‘A Journey to Disillusionment’ writes, “if the Polish resolution had been accepted, the ignominy of December 17 (surrender) would have been avoided. The fact that it demanded the transfer of power to the elected representatives rankled Bhutto. It meant a return of Mujibu Rahman and the Awami League. Bhutto would then have been reduced in political rank. As a parliamentary minority leader, he would have been relegated to the peripheries of power.” Meanwhile, IH Burney, one of the most upright journalist of the country and editor of weekly Outlook in one of his articles maintained that, “had this resolution been passed and acted upon, there would have been no ignominious surrender ceremony. In terms of human suffering the 93,000 soldiers and civilians would not have rotted in Indian jails for two years, there would have been no occupation of territory in West Pakistan, and no new line of control.”

Obviously New Delhi was not in favour of this Resolution, specially the ‘renunciation of occupied territory’ clause, which would have obligated India to once again restore the strategic points on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir that had been seized at some cost. Since the Resolution had the support of Russia, India reluctantly accepted it. But fortunately for New Delhi, Bhutto, the head of the Pakistani delegation to the UN came to their rescue – and two days later Dhaka fell.

The other explanation tells a lot. In an interview with him in 1979, Yahya Khan related a rather curious account of his experience with Bhutto on the Polish resolution. Yahya had been talking to Bhutto who was at the UN meetings in New York – by telephone about several matters. At one point Yahya said that he was far away, of course, but that the Polish resolution looked good, and ‘we should accept it.’ Bhutto replied, ‘I can’t hear you.’ Yahya repeated himself several times, and Bhutto kept saying, ‘What? What?’ The operator in New York finally intervened and said, ‘I can hear him fine,’ to which Bhutto replied ‘shut up.’ Yahya seemed still bemused and bewildered by all this in 1979.

There are two very important diplomats who were not in favour of the Polish Resolution. Then Foreign Secretary Sultan Muhammad Khan in his memoir, ‘Memoirs & Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat’ writes, “it is true that acceptance of either of these resolutions would have spared the humiliation of the  Pakistani armed forces and a large number of civilian personnel being taken prisoners of war, but it would have amounted to surrender nevertheless.” Separately, renowned diplomat Jamsheed Marker in his memoir, ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ stated that, “finally, we need to look at the sequence of events connected with the introduction of the Polish resolution. Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, it emerges as one of the quirks that one finds dotted about in the history of all nations. The ceasefire in Dhaka had commenced at 1700 hours local time on December 15, 1971 and the surrender was signed the next morning. The UNSC took up consideration of Draft Resolution S/10453/Rev. 1 at its meeting that commenced at 1210 hours EST (New York time) on 15 December 1971. By this time the ceasefire had already gone into effect in East Pakistan, and the members of the UNSC, as they took their seats and assumed consideration of the ‘Polish Resolution’, were blissfully unaware that the break-up of Pakistan, one of the UN’s member states, was already a fait accompli.”

A little closer look at the Polish Resolution would, however, show that it favoured Pakistan to quite some extent. Though the acceptance of the Polish Resolution would not have prevented the dismemberment of Pakistan, which in any case was a matter of forgone conclusion yet, its implementation would have averted the sad and stigmatic episode of Pakistan armed forces’ surrender in East Pakistan and becoming Prisoners of War. However, as the Hamoodur Commission reports were never released, much of the truth remains unknown. As such, these different views and records published from time to time and readily available on the internet have been compiled without any concluding remarks to provide a food for thought for readers to draw upon their own conclusions.

POLISH RESOLUTION

A Ceasefire and immediate mutual withdrawal before the capture of Dakha. This would have deprived India of the clear victory it sought.

A quick return of the Pakistan Army under UN arrangements, would have greatly complicated India’s capacity to assist the Awami League in establishing a stable and moderate regime in East Pakistan.

Once both Indian & Pakistani forces returned by virtue of the resolution the conglomeration of Mukti-Bahini forces would have commenced their ‘own civil war for power’, in race to control the new country.

India would have had to restore the strategic points in the Pakistani side of ceasefire line in Kashmir that the Indians had seized at some cost in the 1971 war.