‘Pakistan-US relations are at another crossroads’

Maleeha Lodhi, Former Ambassador

Dr. Maleeha Lodhi enjoys celebrity status among Pakistani diplomats. An internationally recognised intellectual, writer, editor and diplomat, Lodhi served until two years ago as Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York — the first woman to represent the country at the global forum. 

Earlier, she twice served as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States (1993-96, 1999-02) and as High Commissioner to Britain (2003-08).

In her nearly three decades of diplomatic career, she also worked as the member of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Affairs for five years.

Dr. Lodhi enjoys a wide following both in Pakistan and abroad because of her insightful and incisive writings and speeches at various national and international forums. She also enjoys the distinction of being the first Asian woman to become the editor of a national daily newspaper. 

As an acknowledgement of her achievements, she has been awarded the prestigious Hilal-e-Imtiaz award. Dr. Lodhi has authored three books: Pakistan’s Encounter with Democracy, The External Challenge and Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’. Bol News talks to Dr. Lodhi.

 Q. The key opposition party is pushing an anti-American narrative in the country. Do you think it will any way affect the Pak-US relations despite all the reconciliatory efforts by the present government?

Maleeha Lodhi (ML): This is a classic case of the former ruling party finding an alibi for its loss of Parliamentary majority and power by trying to tap into and invoke anti-Americanism. It misused a diplomatic cable from Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington to make the baseless claim of a foreign conspiracy – as if anyone conspiring would convey this to an envoy! Yet, the PTI (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) and its leadership is claiming this as they believe the narrative is getting traction from its base, though this so-called conspiracy is not backed by a shred of evidence. They have also chosen to ignore repeated statements by the country’s military spokesman that there is no basis to the conspiracy claim. I don’t think this will have any long-term impact on Pakistan-US relations which in any case are in transition after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and await a reset.

Q. Institutions deny any US conspiracy in the ouster of the Imran Khan government, but why does the general public tend to believe in Cipher gate?

ML: I don’t think that’s correct. Only die-hard PTI supporters buy this, not the public in general. This is clear from opinion poll surveys. A Gallup Pakistan survey in April found almost two-thirds of the people did not support the conspiracy claim. According to this, 66% of respondents believed Imran Khan was removed because of inflation and not a foreign conspiracy.

Q. President Biden is clear that India is the country with which they would like to deal. Many analysts believe that we only have a transactional relationship with the US and our differences are far too many.

ML: This is too simplistic a formulation and ignores other key factors. Even before Biden became president, when the US decided on a contain-China strategy, it saw India as its partner of choice in the region for obvious reasons – to project India as a counterweight to China. Pakistan also made a strategic choice – to give overriding priority to China, its long term and reliable strategic ally. However, there is plenty of space between these alignments for improved relations between Pakistan and the US.

Washington has recently reiterated several times it wants good relations with Pakistan. The challenge is how to reset and reconfigure this relationship on the basis of Pakistan’s intrinsic importance and not as a subset of ties with a third country, which has been the case for decades.  Pakistan regards ties with the US as among its most critical bilateral relationships. The US remains the single largest market for our exports and important source of FDI. It is also influential with international financial institutions. Pakistan also sees the US as pivotal for regional peace and stability.

Q. What are the key points of divergence in the Pakistan-US relationship?

ML: There are convergences as well as divergences. There are hardly any bilateral relations that don’t have both. The challenge is always to find where interests align and identify where they don’t. That also applies to the Pak-US relationship. Our interests do align in several areas, on issues of global and regional peace and security. But yes, there are disagreements, for example over America’s augmentation of India’s military and strategic capabilities and its policy to contain China. The US-China confrontation obviously has implications for Pakistan-US relations. Islamabad wants to avoid being sucked into this big power rivalry. But this is easier said than done. So long as US-China relations remain unsteady it will have a bearing on ties between Pakistan and the US.

What we do need to acknowledge is that Pakistan-US relations are at another crossroads. This is arguably the third time that the two countries are confronted with having to redefine their relationship which has been so mercurial, a roller coaster, over time. The first time they needed to do this was after the end of the Cold War, then after the Russians were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in the late 1980’s and now after the US pull out from Afghanistan. This in fact also underlines how positive transformations in relations have almost always been driven by events or geopolitical storms extraneous to bilateral ones.

Q. Why do you think that the Biden administration remained so reluctant to engage with the Imran Khan government at the highest level?

ML: That’s a question for the Biden Administration to answer.

Q. Donald Blome will be the first full-time American ambassador to Islamabad after four years. Do you think he would be able to assuage the concerns of the Pakistani people and also of the US?

ML: It’s a good signal from the United States to finally send an ambassador here, after years without one in Islamabad. But it is Washington that sets a policy direction. Better relations will depend on how Islamabad and Washington imaginatively and constructively are able to engage to redefine ties. The US military pull out from Afghanistan has changed the context for the Pak-US relationship. For almost two decades Afghanistan was the principal basis for engagement in our frequently turbulent ties, marked by both cooperation and mistrust. Both countries now seek to turn a new page in the relationship. Islamabad’s vision is to build broad based relations with Washington that move beyond the single focus of security. Pakistan wants more of an economic, trade and investment dimension in ties. Pakistan can benefit from important linkages, especially in education, science and technology, and of course the role of our very enterprising diaspora.

Q. Do you think that the United States still somewhat holds Pakistan responsible for its unsuccessful mission in Afghanistan?

ML: I think we have gone past that. The American public has moved on, and so I believe has the administration and Congress. Pakistan has even less need to focus on the past. It’s the future that merits our attention.

Q. Pakistan has massive stakes in Afghanistan because of its proximity. After the takeover of the Afghan Taliban, has our western border became more secure?

ML: Geography, history, demography, religion and culture bind Pakistan and Afghanistan in a symbiotic relationship. For over 40 years, Pakistan has borne the brunt of war and strife in Afghanistan. Even today, Pakistan hosts over 2 million Afghan refugees, still one of the largest single-country refugee presence anywhere in the world. Thus, Pakistan sees a peaceful, stable and united Afghanistan to be in its vital interest. Multiple dimensions of Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan will preoccupy Islamabad in the years to come.  After the Taliban’s return to power last August, Pakistan has worked closely with the international community to engage its leaders to abide by the promises they have made to the global community. Like the rest of the world, it has withheld recognition of the government. It has sought to help Afghanistan to address its humanitarian and economic crisis as any state collapse will have far reaching consequences for Pakistan. The security of its border regions is contingent on stability in Afghanistan. It also shares the international community’s concerns on a host of issues on which the Taliban seem to be relapsing into past practices such as the closure of girls’ schools, curbs on women’s rights and media freedom.

Q. What are the challenges in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations?

ML: The greatest challenge is Islamabad’s security concerns which have not yet been addressed by Kabul.  The surge of cross border terror attacks since the Taliban’s advent to power remains a major problem. Hopes that a Taliban government would help Pakistan secure its western border have not materialized. The TTP continues to be based in Afghanistan and conducts attacks from there. Around 120 Pakistani military personnel have been martyred in these attacks in the past nine months alone.

This compelled Pakistan to undertake unannounced kinetic action and air strikes targeting TTP entities in Afghanistan. Responding to Taliban’s protests over this, our Foreign Ministry warned Kabul against harbouring terrorists saying “terrorists are using Afghan soil with impunity to carry out activities inside Pakistan.” The latest report of the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team says that the TTP is the “largest component of foreign terrorist fighters in Afghanistan,” with their number estimated at between 3,000 to 4,000 armed men, based in the east and south east of the Pakistan-Afghan border. The May 2022 report also says that the TTP has benefited the most among all foreign terrorist groups from the Taliban’s return to power.

Given Pakistan’s priority to bring an end to the TTP’s 14-year war and restore peace to its border region, it has sought to engage the militant group in talks, with Afghan Taliban leaders acting as mediators. The talks have yielded an indefinite extension of a ceasefire but negotiations continue to reach a broader agreement. The main sticking points are demands by the TTP for reversal of FATA’s merger into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, imposition of Shariah and withdrawal of Pakistan’s military forces from the border areas. These demands are red lines for Pakistan. FATA’s integration was the result of a constitutional amendment and other demands are also impossible to accept. Among the TTP’s demands that have been acceded to are release of some prisoners including high profile commanders and rehabilitation of those willing to forswear fighting and return to Pakistan.  In view of the TTP’s intransigent position on its main demands it is hard to be optimistic about reaching an agreement any time soon.

Although Pakistan may want cooperative relations with Kabul, ties may be testy if our security concerns vis a vis the TTP are not addressed. It is not just Pakistan that has rising concerns about cross border violence. The Taliban are also facing similar concerns from virtually all its neighbours, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. All central Asian countries are countenancing security problems on their borders with Afghanistan.

Careful calibration of ties with Kabul will be needed – economically assisting Afghanistan but avoiding overstretch, and acknowledging that the interests of the Taliban and Pakistan are far from identical. Moreover, in efforts to mobilise international help for Afghanistan, Islamabad must not exhaust its diplomatic capital, which is finite and Pakistan has other foreign policy goals to pursue. We should certainly not act as spokespersons or ambassadors for the Taliban.

Q. The US-India nexus is undermining Pakistani interests. What kind of a challenge does it pose to Pakistan strategically?

ML: Every country has the sovereign right to choose its friends and partners. Pakistan does not see US relations with India in a zero-sum way. But certain aspects of the US-India relationship that directly and negatively impinge on Pakistan are of concern. I mentioned earlier the US strengthening of India’s military and strategic capabilities. We feel this will intensify the strategic imbalance in the region and magnify Pakistan’s security challenge. Aspects of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which aims at containing China, also have security implications for Pakistan not least because it injects cold war dynamics into the Indian Ocean which we have long tried to prevent being India’s Ocean. I also believe that because Washington turned a blind eye to India’s illegal annexation of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 and its subsequent silence on the human rights abuses there that encouraged Delhi to continue its repressive actions in occupied Kashmir, which has intensified the suffering of the Kashmiri people.

Q. Close ties with China have been one of the major foreign policy objectives of Pakistan. Are there any concerns about the future?

ML: Pakistan’s relations with China, time-tested for seven decades, will remain its overriding priority.  China continues to be the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy and its principal long-term strategic ally. More than history, the strategic direction relations have taken in recent years and the addition of the economic dimension has given this partnership added significance at a time of a fundamental change in the international balance of power driven by China’s rise as a global economic powerhouse. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor, launched in 2015, is the pivot of China’s Belt and Road Initiative – the 21st century’s most ambitious economic enterprise.

This envisages enhancing Pakistan’s connectivity, accelerating its economic progress, and expanding and modernizing its road, rail, and energy and transportation systems. The economic corridor is at the heart of two key aspects of China’s Silk Road vision: maritime and land links. With Gwadar providing China the shortest land route to the sea for commercial traffic, connectivity with Pakistan is central to China’s regional economic strategy.

CPEC has involved around 25 billion dollars in direct investment to Pakistan and helped to create over 70,000 jobs. Several energy and hydel and transport infrastructure projects have been completed, many are under construction and a large number of social and livelihood priority projects have also been launched.

But the challenge is to keep relations with China on a positive trajectory and regular reinforcement by sustained high level engagement and working level follow up. Close consultation with Beijing on key global and regional issues, including Afghanistan, will be important. Chinese concerns about the security of their personnel working here will need to be addressed. While CPEC is on track there are issues to address in its second phase. They include simplifying cumbersome bureaucratic approval procedures for investors, dealing with deferred payments to IPPs and promoting more business-to-business cooperation.

Q. The United States has openly demanded that Pakistan should review the CPEC projects, if not leave them totally. Should it be a matter of concern?

ML: The US has frequently criticised CPEC and China’s BRI. Statements by American officials that CPEC will impose a heavy debt burden on Islamabad may be an effort to drive a wedge between Pakistan and China. But that won’t change the fact that China will remain our overriding priority. Such criticism in fact aligns China even more closely to Pakistan. CPEC is a firm indication of China’s interest in strengthening Pakistan, economically and strategically. No amount of criticism can alter that reality.

Q. As premier, Imran Khan laid down the policy that engagement with India is possible only if it rescinds the August 5, 2019 move on Jammu and Kashmir. Do you think it’s the right approach to keep India under pressure?

ML: Let me respond to that question by giving you my take on the overall state of this relationship. First let me say managing relations with India will remain the most imposing challenge for Pakistan’s foreign policy. Relations plunged to a new low after Indian annexed the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, bifurcated it and absorbed it into the Indian union, imposing a long and cruel lockdown there.  Formal dialogue was suspended by India even earlier but after 2019 diplomatic ties were downgraded and trade halted. And yes, Pakistan has said it will not enter a formal dialogue with India unless it rescinds its August 2019 action. So, the diplomatic impasse continues with toughly worded statements exchanged every so often especially as the Modi government is continuing its repressive policy in occupied Kashmir and pressing ahead with demographic changes there, rejecting Pakistan’s protests. It has recently announced a delimitation plan that seeks to disempower Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir and increase the political weight of Hindus. Muslims constitute over 68 percent of J&K’s population while Hindus represent around 28 percent, according to the 2011 census. The Modi government wants to turn this Muslim majority into a minority. This is aimed at paving the way for elections there to consolidate India’s August 2019 action.

This move was roundly rejected in occupied Kashmir by even traditionally pro-India Kashmiri politicians who have participated in elections in the past. All of them called the plan unacceptable as it sought to alter Kashmir’s demography. The views of the true representatives of the Kashmiri people, who are all languishing in jails are well known and are a condemnation of the delimitation as indeed of sham elections they have consistently boycotted in the past.

The hope that back-channel communication at the intelligence level between the two countries last year would yield a thaw turned to disappointment when no headway was made on any front beyond the re-commitment by both neighbours in Feb 2021 to observe a ceasefire on the Line of Control. This was not unimportant as only two years earlier the two neighbours were locked in a dangerous confrontation, epitomised by the Balakot crisis, when Indian planes penetrated and carried out bombing inside Pakistani territory. Backchannel communication played a role in managing tensions but there was no movement on substantive issues.

Prospects of formal dialogue resuming are slim in view of Delhi’s refusal to discuss Kashmir. In view of the persisting diplomatic deadlock the future outlook for Pakistan-India relations is uncertain, if not bleak.

Q. What should Pakistan do to effectively fight the Kashmir case?

ML: Given Pakistan’s internal problems and economic difficulties that is certainly a challenge, Islamabad must keep the Kashmir issue alive internationally, especially at the UN and also have a consistent position and sustained campaign to expose India’s designs which are a brazen violation of international law. Let us remember that there are 11 Security Council Resolutions on Kashmir. Specifically, India’s delimitation move is a contravention of UNSC resolution 38, whose para 2 clearly states that neither party to the dispute can bring about a material change in the situation in Kashmir. We need to keep pushing the boundaries at the international level. Among the diplomatic steps that are necessary is to call for a special session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva exclusively on IoK. We also need to mobilise and sustain a national consensus on our Kashmir policy. That means cross party involvement and an inclusive approach.

Q. It’s been observed that Pakistan is changing its foreign policy objectives too quickly and too sharply. What has been the damage due to the lack of a sustainable and coherent policy?

ML: I do not agree with that observation. Pakistan’s foreign policy has been remarkably stable over the years and is marked by continuity not abrupt departures from the past. Objectives don’t change the way you suggest. Interests have been consistent but what is continuously reviewed is how to promote and protect them in response to the changing global and regional environment. Strategies change, and must.