NSP in a changing world

Pakistan has recently unveiled its National Security Policy (NSP). For some unfathomable reason, the full text of the NSP has been withheld, even after its formal approval by the relevant governmental and security bodies. The National Security Adviser (NSA) has claimed credit for framing the NSP and has held several briefings extolling its virtues.

By keeping the policy under wraps so far, the government has given the impression that it has something to hide from public about the broad thrust of the policy. The opposition has already boycotted the session of the national parliament committee where the policy was presented for discussion in December 2021.

Notwithstanding its boycott by the mainstream political parties, the absence of public debate about the NSP deepens the impression that there are aspects of the NSP that the government is uncomfortable talking about.

Based on the briefings given by NSA and fragments of the policy that have appeared in national media, the NSP puts human security at the centre of this policy. The focus of the NSP would be on citizens, economic security and military. Apart from the economic and military issues, the NSP sheds “light on the country’s water security as well as population growth, terrorism and foreign policy, particularly concerning the Kashmir and Afghan issues and relations with other countries in the region and beyond.”

Other dimensions of Pakistan’s national security – conventional military balances, technological imperative of military modernisation, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence – have taken a back seat.

This has been hailed as a “paradigmatic” shift in Pakistan’s thinking about its security problematique.

Yet the fact remains that while non-traditional security challenges such as water scarcity, climate change, demographic change, pandemics have risen to the forefront of contemporary Pakistan, Islamabad has to remain concerned about the security of its borders on the East and West and has to have resources to ensure its survival in an increasingly anarchic environment.

While human security is a good moral precept its pursuit per force has to wait till Pakistan’s survival as an entity is ensured.

One can make a strong argument that Pakistan’s conventional defence is robust and, to boot, it is a nuclear weapon-state; therefore, threats emanating from its turbulent external environment have less strategic salience as compared to its myriad of internal challenges.

Yet the hard reality is that we have entered an era of “information warfare” in which information and soundbites have been weaponised and are being deployed by our adversaries to destabilise us. Security of our critical infrastructure – NADRA, WAPDA, dams, banks, electric grids, digitised nodes – has become vital for our viability as a state.

One wonders how the NSP proposes to deal with the changing nature of these non-kinetic threats and their potential devastating impact on Pakistan’s security.

It is obvious that Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear capabilities cannot be used to tackle these threats. Short of cases of direct military aggression from India, Pakistan needs a crisis-management strategy to tackle a range of threats at the sub-conventional level.

As history attests, Pakistan’s central security problem has been India, and given New Delhi’s drive for strategic modernisation that is being backed by Washington, it could become an overarching threat to Pakistan in the longer run. Islamabad can only ignore this threat at its own peril.

During the height of the Cold War, the late Arnold Wolfers had identified three sets of goals which a country could pursue. According to him, these according to him were: self-preservation, self-extension and self-abnegation. The corresponding national security policy would be defensive, offensive, and pacifist. Pakistan can choose between the first two options, as the third option – short of appeasing India and conceding New Delhi’s hegemony – is not a viable option.

There are many fault-lines internally but the most serious one involves the relations between centre and the provinces. The gulf of alienation between Sindh and the Federation is growing wide and the province of Balochistan is faced with the threat of a serious agitation symbolised by the Gwadar protests.

Many analysts have pointed out the lack of the popular ownership of the NSP. Political parties are legitimate stakeholders in the formulation of the NSP and even though the NSA has claimed to have held consultations with a wide array of stakeholders, including civil society, intellectuals, media personalities, defence and security analysts, before announcing the policy, the very fact that the main opposition political parties had boycotted the meetings of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security on December 6, where the draft of the NSP was presented, has dented its nation-wide acceptance.

There is a distinct impression that the NSP is top-driven, even though the NSA has claimed it to be people-centric.

As editorially noted by one newspaper: “The people of Pakistan and their representatives sitting in legislative bodies deserve a chance to access and read this policy that will have an impact on their near future. We can only hope the ideas discussed at the meeting can be converted into reality which goes beyond discussion and the expression of a resolution to solve the problems of people.”

Another problem with the NSP is the lack of a clearly defined implementation mechanism. Prime Minister Imran Khan has instructed the NSA to monitor its “implementation” on monthly basis and “submit” its progress report to the National Security Committee every month.

Notwithstanding the government’s claim that the NSP is a “dynamic document” that will be subjected to annual review, taking into account the fast changing regional and global environment, the basic thrust of the NSP, like such documents, tends to be status-quo oriented.

The biggest problem that the NSP would face is to find resources for its implementation. With Pakistan’s economy in dire straits, reorienting the country towards human security would be a huge challenge.

This is known as Lippmann Fallacy: Aligning country’s commitment with its resources. To overcome this fallacy, the best course of action Pakistan would be to seek a balance between its minimal security requirement and its developmental needs.

The writer is a political scientist and defence analyst.