Terrorism, talks and the strategy of dislocation

When Antaeus, son of the sea god Poseidon and the Earth goddess Gaia, challenged Heracles to a wrestling match, Heracles noted that every time he threw Antaeus to the ground, Antaeus rose stronger than before. He realised that Antaeus’ source of strength was Gaia. Heracles then grabbed Antaeus, held him aloft and crushed him to death.

We call it the strategy of dislocation. Dislocate the adversary from his source of strength. Manipulate or, if you will, change the context of the fight.

More than interstate war, the strategy of dislocation underpins counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT). But let’s park this thought for a moment and get to the context.

On Tuesday, the Prime Minister’s Office put out a statement revealing that the Parliamentary Committee on National Security had formally approved the process of negotiations with the TTP, a terrorist group, and a Parliamentary Oversight Committee will monitor the process. Technically, this means that the talks will not be conducted secretly by the front-end negotiators and any deal, if one can be got, will be scrutinised by the oversight committee and, by extension, Parliament.

The same day in Karachi, the Sindh Information Minister, Sharjeel Memon, told a presser that the suicide attack at Karachi University’s Confucius Institute had been planned and executed by two banned terrorist groups, the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Balochistan Liberation Front. Memon also spoke of the involvement of a foreign country where BLA’s Majeed Brigade was headquartered. The so-called Brigade is BLA’s elite outfit which mounts terror attacks on security forces and Chinese interests in Pakistan.

There is no talk of negotiating a truce — leading to a settlement — with Baloch terrorist groups: the question here is why? Why has the state tried multiple times to talk to the Taliban terror groups and not with the Baloch groups?

Admittedly, the two terrorist entities are different. While Baloch terrorism is part of a struggle for secession from Pakistan, the TTP (and its franchisees) are not secessionist: they want to take over the state rather than to break away from it. The point here is not whether either the Baloch can secede or the TTP can take over. Neither is possible in any real sense, though the TTP’s ideological penetration is far greater. But the difference is important in terms of devising strategies to deal with them.

Let’s now return to COIN, CT and the strategy of dislocation. What’s the difference between insurgency and terrorism? Insurgency is a broader politico-military strategy and can have many contexts: national insurgent forces against foreign or colonial occupation or a broader or limited civil war for secession on the basis of ethno-linguistic or other differences or control of the state.

There is generally a power asymmetry between the insurgent groups (the weaker party) and the government. In the case of foreign or colonial occupation, the insurgents seek to throw out the foreigners and acquire political power themselves. While violence — including terror tactics — is an important tool for insurgents, they invariably use the broader ideological and social-activism framework for strategic communication in order to have the people on their side, what Andrew Mack called “people sea” in which the “guerrilla fish” can hide.

In this sense, and without going into the difficulties of defining terrorism, one could use the definition given by Leonard Weinberg et al: “Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.” (The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism; 2010). Put another way, terrorism is a tactic while insurgency is a broader strategy which can and often does employ terror tactics. By the same token, countering insurgency or terrorism (COIN/CT) will have to use strategies keeping in mind the linkage as well as the distinction between insurgency and terrorism.

Both the TTP franchise and the Baloch groups have used terror tactics; both have also tried to raise the level of their activities to an insurgency. The TTP succeeded up until 2009 when it controlled territory, necessitating military operations. The Baloch groups have been less successful in terms of controlling territory, though many parts of Balochistan remain dangerous and restive.

The strategy of dislocation operates in a broader framework involving political initiatives, addressing socioeconomic grievances and weaning the population away from the insurgent/terror groups. The judicious use of force, however, forms a crucial part of the broader strategy. While it cannot be an end in itself, it is a vital means towards the end.

On that score, my views are known. CT is not about sitting and waiting. It is about taking the war to the enemy. That, evidently, requires focus, high-end training of CT forces and top-notch intelligence gathered both through technical means as well as human sources.

It is, therefore, deeply disconcerting that despite being engaged with and against Afghanistan and in Balochistan, our intel capabilities are less than satisfactory. It was evident when we bombed some areas in Afghanistan in April. Contrast that, for instance, with Israeli capabilities.

In May, two motorcyclists killed a senior Quds Force commander Sayyad Khodaei near the central street of Majdan al-Islam in eastern Tehran, the most high-profile assassination inside Iran since the 2020 killing of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. In both instances, Tehran blamed Israel.

Earlier in June, Colonel Ali Esmailzadeh, a commander of the Guards’ Quds Force, died “in an accident in his home”, according to Iran’s state news agency IRNA. On June 13, Ali Kamani, a member of the Guards’ aerospace division, was killed while on a mission in Khomein in the central province of Markazi. His death was reported by the Guards through a statement that did not elaborate how he died.

Around the same time, in June, Israeli intelligence picked up a plot by an alleged Iranian cell to kidnap some Israeli tourists in Istanbul, including reportedly a former ambassador and his wife. They passed on the intel to Turkey. On June 17, Turkish intelligence service and police arrested 10 people that included both Iranians and local collaborators. The incident was reported by Turkish press. The Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid thanked Turkey for foiling the plot.

Result: Hossein Taeb, a cleric who had long been the chief of IRGC’s intelligence organisation was removed from his post late last month.

My point here is that when a state is locked in conflict with state or non-state entities, it has to focus on winning. Israel is an abomination at many levels. But it has honed (and continues to) its military and intel capabilities in a way that is not only impressive but which we need to emulate.

In other words, while we must try to resolve conflicts, we must never take the effective use of force off the table.

The writer is a journalist with interest in foreign and security policies