Sino-Russian strategic engagement

Moscow, Beijing remain clear about challenges to regional peace and multilateral cooperation today

There are many reasons why diplomatic engagement between Beijing and Moscow remains substantial to this day. Among them lie productive, economic and trade interests.

Moreover, there is a long-standing Sino-Russian determination to uphold genuine multilateralism and its practice amidst evolving international developments.

That determination stands to gain even further as China and Russia invest in their comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era. Unlike many in the West, Moscow and Beijing remain clear about the challenges to regional peace and multilateral cooperation today.

Consider the September visit by prominent Chinese lawmaker Li Zhanshu to Russia, where he underlined the merits of Russian-Chinese cooperation.

There was a mature diplomatic understanding that both Moscow and Beijing should share more experience in legislation “regarding fighting against external interference, sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction.”

Russia’s own appeal against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) unilateral imperatives is one that advances the cause of a multipolar order. As such, it merits experience sharing between Sino-Russian leaderships on challenges to that order.

After all, stronger strategic engagements between Moscow and Beijing have illuminated the risks of sustained military interference in shared spaces, including the Eurasian continent.

Similarly, it was their strategic ties that illuminated the risks of protracted unrest in the region if the West choses to overlook legitimate security interests of nations.

For these reasons, Moscow’s recent support to “increase engagements with China at all levels” and step up engagements in multilateral settings should be seen as a measure of assurance. Particularly for strategically significant regions in their broader neighbourhood, such as the Asia-Pacific.

On geopolitical interference, it is a fact that NATO’s push for eastward militarization has led to a more complicated external security environment.

It is informed by Washington’s erroneous and persistent portrayal of Moscow and Beijing as strategic rivals and a threat to NATO’s global domination ambitions.

But rising military expenditures should only strengthen strategic support and interaction between Russia and China, especially when both countries have led principled positions against military blocs in the past.

Closed security groupings in the Asia Pacific deserve to be called out, and so do ‘zero-sum’ mentalities that have hampered progress in consequential relationships. A case in point is the United States’ own cold war view of Beijing’s peaceful rise, much to its own disadvantage.

However, to the bilateral credit of China and Russia, free and open development has flourished in the face of counterproductive defense and military blocs.

Consider the case of Far East development: it is a cooperation pivot jointly promoted by Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

Stronger parallels between Russia’s growth strategies in this space, and that of China’s Northeast revitalization plan, strike a much-needed contrast to NATO’s false portrayal of Sino-Russian integration efforts as rivalrous.

That bloc narrative ignores that multipolarity can truly thrive once growth strategies in shared regional spaces – including the Far East – are better aligned.

It heightens the prospect of evenly distributing connectivity benefits among neighbouring countries as well, ensuring more uniform and equitable progress.

Most importantly, these win-win arrangements were made without the costs of American hegemony, harassment and its policy of force. Joint counteraction as the defining theme of Sino-Russian engagement ought to be ensured.

China-Russia strategic cooperation also strengthens the case for strategic vigilance against external aggressors and gross interference. That includes persistent US-led provocations in the Taiwan Strait, and the deliberate undermining of Asia-Pacific peace by testing sovereign redlines.

Russia’s support for China’s core issues has been uniformed across senior ranks, and Beijing’s firm opposition to external interference promotes a healthy model of diplomatic reciprocity. Asia-Pacific and countries across the Eurasian continent can gain from that momentum.

“China will also firmly support Russia in rallying and leading the Russian people under the leadership of President Putin to achieve strategic development goals against all the odds and disturbance,” said Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to his Russian counterpart, according to an October read-out published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Fortunately, on the economic side, Sino-Russian strategic interactions are marked by dozens of intergovernmental projects worth billions of dollars.

They carry the promise of promoting valuable connectivity in the region, and can easily serve as one of the bridges between the East and the West.

That should be the stated goal of other power centres in the strategic stability space, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union.

In firm contrast, what cannot serve as a force for stability and lasting peace is NATO’s insistence on eastward militarization, and its attempts to reduce what has been described as the “strategic space” of China and Russia in Eurasia.

As a result, stronger growth and resilience of China’s comprehensive strategic partnership is critical to drive strategic stability. Any attempt to challenge it should be met with principled pushback.

The writer is a foreign affairs commentator and recipient of the Fulbright Award