Addressing Iraq’s instability

Conflict that was once heavily inspired by sectarian influence risks becoming a challenging chapter in Iraq’s history. It shows as rival Shia groups fight for influence, power and ownership in a country that has seen too much of it, and partly enabled by Washington’s decades-old occupation. Middle East’s quest for lasting peace continues.

The entire region should remain alert as a streak of deadly escalations between rival Iraqi forces in Baghdad resulted in over two dozen casualties and injured hundreds. Among the core drivers of Iraq’s recent spell of violent clashes are decades-old US tactics that left militia loyalties divided and transformed Iraq into a theatre of inter-Shiite rivalry. Now that same rivalry is at the centre of a much-feared civil war build-up which threatens Iraq’s immediate neighbours. It also brings to light Washington’s role in cultivating economic and political stability which provided fertile ground to political opportunists, all but ensuring that the country never recovers from the crisis.

Consider a glaring example. Muqtada-al-Sadr, the firebrand Shia cleric whose resignation fuelled deadly scenes, is a well-known beneficiary of the US interference in Iraq. Sadr’s divisive power, barrier to independent government formation in Iraq, and violent contestation of post-election stability, are all born out of America’s post-occupation unrest. That includes a firmly consolidated Sadrist cult base that has an outsized consideration in Iraq’s present political turmoil. More importantly, this is the same Sadrist base that centres on population segments which the US itself has targeted, disempowered and marginalised for years through its military occupation. How can stability find a starting point when the determinants of conflict and unrest are so pronounced?

Washington’s clear refusal to take responsibility for the country’s deepening turmoil, and cosmetic US support for a stable and sovereign Iraq, culminates into a damning indictment of American “commitments” to Baghdad. Several US officials have spoken out amidst the violence, but have confined their support to concerned US citizens in the country. Iraqis – after decades of war – are still an afterthought.

It is abundantly clear that America’s penchant for supporting violent insurgencies in Iraq has helped little known movements branch off into competing, socio-political alliances. These include the same alliances that now cost ordinary Iraqis their functional, cohesive government. Some disruptive actors, such as the “Coordination Framework” alliance, are still viewed by some quarters of the US strategic community as good reason to potentially court Sadr. Some keen observers have made that known. This way, the US can capitalise on more divisive, cross-sectarian alliances in crisis-stricken Iraq and favour an interventionist approach from afar. That is the rationale, rather than helping Iraq put the brakes on its violent post-election fallout.

Note that America’s tacit refusal to end its flagrant interference in Iraq, and consciously approach the inter-Shia rivalry as geopolitical mileage, keeps the door open to a dangerous civil war build-up. After all, it remains to be seen what the United States will do to support Iraq’s stability, especially if the current civil war build-up continues unabated. Cosmetic guarantees for peace are unlikely to cut it when the discord between speech and action is increasingly compromising.

History suggests that the US course could translate into more lip service, particularly to peace in Iraq, once rival blocs refuse to budge from their contrarian positions. Look no further than the White House’s empty calls for “dialogue” and its declaration of present violence as simply “disturbing.” How assuring is that for the Middle East?

None of the platitudes add up because it is the approach to dialogue and government formation that has caused disagreements among groups, not the absence of “dialogue” itself. So it is in the interests of the US and its partners to address the drivers of instability, rather than promoting vague “dialogue” as a one-size-fits-all approach.

Secondly, it is the US – not Iraq – that has helped incentivise inter-militia conflicts between actors that were once very united. This has given way to deadly clashes and heightened confrontations in present-day Baghdad, led by rising political tempers in the “Green Zone”, a heavily fortified area built on the back of the US occupation.

“The government [of Iraq] should work on ending the presence of all foreign forces,” Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohamed al-Halbousi said after a landmark vote to expel US-led coalition troops from the country in 2020. Note that the United States still continued to intervene through military support, drawing fire from the likes of Kataib Hezbollah and Sadr’s own militia movement. These flagrant US violations have helped fuelled further resistance in crisis-stricken Iraq, a dynamic that still threatens the dream of lasting stability in the midst of present political turmoil.

Washington’s own military occupation may have ended, but its notorious role in escalating Iraq’s inter-Shiite power struggle remains central to many challenges hereon. Those challenges include a non-existent government, an absent budget for urgent spending and public service delivery, and hundreds and thousands of civilians left without cash from the top. It also includes a renewed civil war build-up with select actors that the US spent years trying to split and resist – all at the cost of national unity in Iraq.

The writer is a foreign affairs commentator and recipient of the Fulbright Award