Dealing with terrorism in 2023

The first step towards dealing with a threat is to appreciate that it exists. The next step is to profile the threat, i.e., develop the processes for identifying and documenting the threat. This leads to assessing the adversary, his motivations and methods in order to design a response.

The next step would be to determine vulnerabilities, both one’s own and the adversary’s. This would entail developing scenarios and formulating strategies to counter them. Put another way, the assessment process is meant to understand the full spectrum of a threat, how it is likely to unfold, its consequences and identifying metrics for an effective response.

As 2023 dawns, Pakistan faces multiple challenges and threats. I will stick to one: terrorism.

Note, threats can normally not be dealt with in isolation. For instance, economic insolvency will exacerbate the threat of terrorism because terrorist groups draw recruits from a dissatisfied and burdened population. Also, lack of money impacts a state’s capacity to deal with the threat. Political instability can be another challenge and compound the problem of dealing with the terrorist threat.

These concerns are genuine. But my purpose here is to focus on terrorism for two reasons. One, to parse a threat that has reared its ugly head again, and as we go into 2023, it is likely to cause us much pain. Two, while economic and political challenges must be urgently addressed, they need not prevent us from developing a robust counterterrorism strategy.

Take Israel, for example, which has gone through five elections in a span of three-and-half years and is still unstable, given the current ideological make-up of the coalition headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. Yet, Israel remains on top of its game when dealing with what it considers security threats (both physical and cyber), has made peace with three Arab countries and, despite the pandemic, seen the economy grow.

How? Agreement on certain threats and continuity of policy despite political changes.

Corollary: even if a state has other vulnerabilities, it can address certain threats if there’s a broad socio-political consensus on what those threats are and how to respond to them. In simple terms, policy continuity can do much to reduce the pain and offset the impact of other weaknesses.

So, let’s come back to terrorism. As I have written elsewhere, the warning signals were coming our way since 2020, but we ignored them. The years 2021 and 2022 saw further spike because of a number of factors. The question, therefore, is why are we getting back into this cycle? To understand the import of this question, let me refer first to two recent statements, one by the prime minister, the other by the chief of the army staff. The PM “resolved” to fight the menace of terrorism after an IED attack in Kahan, Balochistan killed an officer and four soldiers. Similarly, at the 254th Corps Commanders’ Conference (27-28 December), the army leadership “resolved to fight against terrorists without any distinction and eliminate this menace as per the aspirations of the people of Pakistan.”

What does this mean? The answer to this question is closely related to the question of why we are getting back into this cycle, given that (a) we knew that following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, the TTP and other such groups had found just the right ecosystem to flourish and (b) that India had ratcheted up its support for Baloch terrorist groups. Do state institutions wake up only after a threat begins to metastasise?

Let me explain this through another example from Israel. In 2014, Israel decided to become a world leader in high-tech, cyber industry and applications. It chose Beersheba, a southern, small city in the Negev desert. The Israeli and foreign tech companies that have since come to the CyberPark give Israel its edge. A plan was developed to create synergies between the private and defence sectors. The IDF’s tech branches scout for 18-year-olds and train the creme de la creme from the groups thus recruited. After training, these men and women go on to do their compulsory military service. Some stay on in the IDF while others return to the private sector. But the linkage between the private companies and the IDF remains, each supplementing the other.

There are two points here. One, regardless of the number of elections Israel goes into, regardless of political bickering and infighting among multiple parties, the institutions created continue to do their job. The tech companies, the recruitment of the young, their training, threat perception, assessment, and counter strategies maintain a continuum regardless of what’s happening in the Knesset. Two, they do not win battles and then go into sleep mode. They don’t take a snapshot view. They develop, and respond to, the longer trajectory. This not only helps in dealing with existing threats, but also in planning for those that are likely to emerge. Staying ahead of the curve is how it works, not playing catch-up.

How does it work here? The answer should be fairly obvious. This is not to say that those on the frontlines do not perform. They do. But their tasks are tactical. And while tactical responses are vital, they must be covered by an overarching strategy. That’s the task of the politico-military leadership.

This is an op-ed, not a research paper so I don’t have the space to go into the details of what needs to be done, but one example should be instructive in regard to the situation as it is panning out: police and civil administration. I have, for years, argued that the best tool for counterterrorism is the police. Police forces are the state’s coercive arm for internal security. And yet, we have failed rather woefully at police reforms and empowering the police forces. It’s not an issue of human resource. The army recruits from the same pool. It is a problem of empowerment, poor organisational structures and career trajectories, training and lack of specialisation.

Despite these constraints, the police has produced some remarkable officers who, when allowed to work, have given results. It’s the same with the civil administration, generally considered lackadaisical. Empowerment is important. Army officers generally complain about lack of capacity on the civilian side. This is only partially true. In the case of police forces and civil intelligence agencies, the banyan tree that doesn’t allow any other plants to grow under it is the Inter-Services Intelligence. That doesn’t bode well for the police forces and their intel arms.

Further, while police forces can’t operate tanks, attack helicopters and fighter jets, they can have specialised units to deal with situations like the one that developed at Bannu. Training hard and empowerment can ensure that a situation like Bannu does not come to pass. Similarly, if we are alert to threats, we would be smart enough to ensure that we don’t get to the stage where we have to employ offensive platforms that are only available to the army.

Going into 2023, we must ensure to develop a strategy that is clear-eyed and is worked all round in order to develop a long-term design to deal with the terrorism threat.

The writer is a journalist with interest in foreign and security policies