Dealing with TTP headwinds

In a January 4 statement, the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threatened the leaders of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and Pakistan Peoples Party, the two main political parties in the ruling coalition. The statement followed a National Security Committee meeting that evaluated the terrorist threat from the TTP and resolved to take action.

Addressing a press meet, hours after the TTP statement, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah spoke about taking “pre-emptive action” against the irreconcilable elements in the TTP. Sounds good in words. But what action is the state actually planning to take?

Let’s begin with the environment. The last time the state fought this war, Afghanistan was witnessing an insurgency against a United States-led coalition of western military powers. The Afghan Taliban (TTA) were focused against NATO-ISAF, used Pakistan’s tribal (and some settled) areas for resting, retrofitting, rotation, supplies, and keeping their families safe et cetera. They were helped in that endeavour by the local Taliban and while the Pakistan Army was fighting the local TTP, as part of their broader survival and insurgency strategy, the Afghan Taliban did not really take part in that fight.

Now, the situation is different. The foreign troops have left, and Afghanistan is controlled by the TTA. Pakistan’s immediate concern, the TTP, is based there and there is no indication that the TTA will take action against the TTP. In fact, as I assessed last year, the TTA will use the TTP as leverage against Islamabad. Furthermore, Sirajuddin Haqqani is no longer facilitating talks between the TTP and Pakistan. And Yaqoob Mujahid, the son of Mullah Omar, has on more than one occasion, expressed his animosity towards Pakistan. It is safe to assume that his sentiment is endorsed by the TTA Amir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, who is also the leader of the Kandahari faction.

In short, the environment has completely changed. The TTP is being — and will be — supported by the TTA. Any action against the TTP, especially inside Afghanistan, will be deemed by the TTA as action against Afghanistan. This is not a hypothesis. The TTA leaders have already stated this. The second issue is about what action to take. Any student of warfare and military strategy knows that any action must appreciate the operational and strategic environment. Given that the environment has transformed heavily in favour of the TTP, operational planning and execution must also change to take that into account.

The primary threat now is the increased likelihood of the TTP mounting an insurgency. By an “insurgency” I mean the term as defined by Thomas Mockaitis, i.e., “a hybrid form of conflict that combines subversion, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism”. The TTP, with support from the TTA, with sanctuaries in Afghanistan and local support in the tribal districts, can resort to a combination of “subversion, guerrilla and terrorist tactics…to establish political control over (parts of) a country”, in this case beginning with the tribal districts.

For this to happen, the TTP would need to widen its support base through subversive methods. This is nothing new. It happened earlier in Swat, Lower and Upper Dir, Bajaur and in other tribal districts. The TTP strategy will be pegged on offering better prospects than the government and would rely on a mix of carrots and sticks. It will seek to out-administer the government, just like it tried before. Another spin-off effect will be recruitment from among the local population to strengthen the group’s military punch. This isn’t atypical and has happened elsewhere.

Simultaneously, the TTP would continue attacking security forces, using hit-and-run tactics, IEDs and terrorist attacks in the urban heartland. Terrorist acts are important, not because they have a major military effect, but because of their psychological dimension. Datasets show IEDs as one of the primary threats to security forces and civilians. Frequent terrorist attacks, even when the loss of life is not very high, create the perception that the government is not in control of the situation. In the periphery, they force even the recalcitrant in the local population to collaborate. In the heartland they also have a political impact.

Another strategy, after such groups take partial control of the territory or have sanctuaries to which they can retreat, is to employ direct firepower against isolated military posts. That too is not new. We saw this happen in the tribal districts. The NATO-ISAF posts saw this tactic in Afghanistan and Iraq.

So, how to deal with this? Use of massive force or the desire to have a decisive battle against an elusive adversary doesn’t work. This is not a battle with a defined front, rear and flanks. The rigid infantry tactics of hoplites in phalanx formations is not how you fight gnats. Instead, you need to approximate a spider’s web and entrap the enemy. That requires sophisticated, actionable intelligence for precise engagement (ground and aerial) to neutralise the threat.

Let me here add another important point, which is generally misunderstood. There is no real termination point in this contest. To think that this threat can be entirely eradicated is to be naive. The insurgent/terrorist wants to win by not losing. The state’s objective should be to deny him that space. Pre-emption in that sense, the term used by Sanaullah, is about staying ahead of the terrorist and neutralising him. A good example is the headache caused to the TTA by the Islamic State, Khorasan.

The problem right now— and it’s known to officers at all levels — is lack of good intelligence. For instance, there is very little advanced warning about infiltration attempts. This means sending out patrols to cover large areas in a contested zone where the TTP has local support. Since they don’t wear uniform, the only way the patrols find out if someone is a terrorist is when he/they open fire. Given local support, the TTP have better intel on patrolling routes (and water parties) to set up ambushes or place roadside IEDs.

Result: immense psychological impact on patrolling troops. If troops have no way of identifying the enemy, they become paranoid and treat everyone as hostile until (s)he is proven otherwise. In practical terms this means harassment for the local population. Harassment creates resentment. Resentment begets more local support for the TTP. As Bernard Fall wrote about the First Indochina War in Street Without Joy, “One French officer even compared French actions with Don Quixote’s fight against the windmills.”

Violence is necessary. But it must be unleashed when the enemy has been identified. In other words, while necessary, it may not be sufficient. As many COIN/CT experts have noted, the local population is the key to winning.

Broadly, any policy must require the following kinetic and non-kinetic options: (a) we have to understand that there’s a hostile government in Afghanistan (barring, only to some extent, the Haqqanis); (b) we must plan knowing different factions and their internal tensions; (c) we must have a CT policy that hits Kabul along strategic nodes so they realise that the TTP, far from being an asset, is a liability. This is not just about kinetic actions. It involves friendly states and non-kinetic options, an example being China signing a $540 million deal with Afghanistan to develop an oil and gas field in Sheberghan in the Amu Darya basin; (d) to expand our options, we need to improve relations with the US (which is interested in CT in Afghanistan); (e) after the fall of Kabul and the TTA’s hostility, our interests, at some points, are now aligned with the US; (f) but while co-opting the US, we also need to improve our intel capabilities so we can, if need be, neutralise targets inside Afghanistan with precision; (g) we need to talk to the Turks who have, after initial reverses, developed a good capacity to operate against hostile targets in Syria, Iraq and Libya.

Of course, all of this requires dedicated planning and coordination for a long haul. So, fasten your seatbelts.

The writer is a journalist with interest in foreign and security policies