Enigma of Pak-US relations

The Pak-US relationship remains an enigma. Both the countries have parallel interests that never converge and lop-sided expectations that focus on nothing, but security – right from the time of the gloomy days of World War II and the Cold War up to the recent withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan. With the repeated national narrative characterized by abandonment and rejection fed by the political milieu, one wonders if the Pakistani government’s complicated love-hate relationship, bordering on bipolar with the US, will always disillusion the Pakistani public.

For American and Pakistani emissaries, diplomats, bureaucrats, military and intelligence, and think tank analysts, who are destined to work with one another, this imprinted vision of continuous mutual self-destruction strikes close to home. For various reasons, Pakistan has been unstable owing to internal pandemonium and chaos. Meanwhile, Washington and Islamabad are left with nothing, but frustration and abandonment. Sounds familiar? Before Pakistan so regularly made headlines in America, the relationship was also a strained one. As aptly accounted in Daniel Markey’s book, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad, Pakistan and the US are Sartre’s sinners who have tortured each other for decades, if in very different ways. Both sides consider they have been sinned against. Even when the relations were fairly well, there were underlying disagreements that hindered building strong, viable cooperation.

When Obama took office in 2009, there were quite a few books published emphasizing the failures, deception and flaws of the US-Pakistan relationship. Most of these books, such as Mark Mazzetti’s The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, Vali Nasr’s The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, and David Sanger’s Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power offer insider interpretations of the US and Pakistani political crescendos that made it so, with precise focus on the US counter-terrorism policies and the War on Terror in Afghanistan.

Understanding the circumstances and reasons for the creation of Pakistan related to US standing the world, after the WWII, I ponder about the full gamut: Cold War cooperation, sanctions, anti-Americanism, energy, trade, infrastructure development, India, China, the Musharraf years, demographics, youth culture, Afghanistan, the Osama bin Laden raid, among many others.

The recent theatrics in the political circuit of Pakistan explains the distinct interests, political and otherwise, of both the countries as well as the environment that necessitated cooperation. Since 1947, the US policymakers have been more frustrated than successful in dealing with Pakistan. The disputes have repeatedly veered into deeper hostility and violence. Both can be equally blamed for not being able to come to a middle ground for mutual benefit. Pakistan has had a turbulent past with obvious emphasis on issues related to India. It is important to provide a balanced view of the relationship between Pakistan and the US, in order to impart knowledge in a more logical and objective way, by establishing a link between the internal issues and external influences stemming from India and the US-Pakistan’s anti-Indian stance often drives its foreign policy towards other countries which are friendly towards India. Thus, US support for India will always be an issue for Pakistan. In Southern Asia, relations between the US and Pakistan have unravelled even as US-India and China-Pakistan ties have strengthened. The region now faces deepening and more multidimensional polarization. Needless to say, global competition adds fuel to regional conflict and reduces options for conciliation.

As one touches upon the origin of Pakistani anti-American attitude through the history of US-Pakistan relations from 1947 to 2001, one can assess how Washington devised and employed policies regarding Pakistan following the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001, and analyse how regional dynamics, especially the rise of China, shape US-Pakistan relations.

While the foreign policy in Pakistan was thrown into disorder by the September 11 attacks, earlier there were other irritants like US sanctions, American pressure on its nuclear weapons program, and the CIA’s reliance on Pakistan’s clandestine support during the Afghan invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979. When the Cold War ended, Pakistan’s nuclear program moved ahead at full steam as the US-Pakistan relationship fell into a disastrous, decade-long tailspin.

During the late 1970s, the two countries behaved more like rivals than allies. When Pakistani student protesters wrecked the US embassy in Islamabad in 1979, Pakistan’s ruling General Zia-ul-Haq decided to let the protest burn itself out rather than endeavour a stern rescue attempt. There were several cases of American ‘betrayals’, such as the time when the US did not behave like an ally to Pakistan in the wars with India in 1965 or 1971, or in 1990 when Washington sanctioned Pakistan for adopting a nuclear weapons program.

However, the Western think tanks see this though a different lens. They discern that it was Pakistan’s own choices – to go to war with India and to build nuclear program – that led to predictable responses, not betrayals. Therefore, Pakistanis and Americans convey differing versions of the same history. There is a grain of truth to the Pakistani complaint that America has used their country when it suited the superpower’s vested interests and then chucked it when it became troublesome.

Since Pakistan gained independence in 1947, the US has considered Pakistan as a means to an end, whether that meant combating communism, battling terrorism or pursuance of the nuclear program. When Pakistan was cooperative, it enjoyed generous American assistance, diplomatic support, or equipment that would be useful against hostile India. When Pakistan was uncooperative, the cord was cut. Similarly, the fact remains that Pakistan also used America, when the former’s leaders dipped into the latter’s deep pockets to serve their agendas, sometimes corrupt, oftentimes driven by persistent geopolitical conflict with neighbouring India.

Both sides failed to build a relationship that would serve both beyond the immediate needs of the day. The tangled relationship between the two resulted in growing uncertainty, caution, and distrust. The muck seeps into every debate, in public and private conversations, where Pakistanis habitually hold America responsible for a wide range of events inside their country, sometimes by way of tangled conspiracy theories. Whether the conversation turns to government corruption, suicide bombers, or repetitive electrical blackouts, the US usually takes a lion’s share of the blame. One can only see three options for the US strategy: defensive insulation, military-first cooperation, and comprehensive cooperation. Washington can prepare for the worst, aim for the best, and avoid past mistakes.

The writer is a journalist based in Karachi