Khan’s Struggle and Contradictions

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who will guard the guardians?) — Juvenal

“The civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorise.” — Peter D. Feaver

Last week, I asked the question about where the principal contradiction lies in the politics of this country. My reference was to the concept as put forward by Mao Zedong in his 1937 essay, On Contradiction.

Since then, former prime minister Imran Khan has said more about the military, especially in an interview for a national daily. Let me present some salient points from that interview report.

“Army is powerful and organised and I thought they would help me bring rule of law in the country and play an important part.”
“NAB [National Accountability Bureau] was controlled by the army. I couldn’t do anything…I discovered that…the establishment controlled NAB and proceeded as it wanted…They would squeeze someone, but then he would be out on bail.”
“The army chief wanted me to have Aleem Khan [as CM Punjab] and I wouldn’t” because there were “NAB cases against him [and] he had occupied and sold land worth millions belonging to the government.”
“They [Army] were organised, you could get their help, we were on the same page regarding foreign policy. It was just the last six months, the issue of them making deals with these crooks [Opposition, now the government coalition] when they should be behind bars…”
“We didn’t have the power. This time, if I ever come [back to power], I will not take the government if I don’t have a majority and can’t make a difference. If you have a coalition, a thin majority, and are being blackmailed by your own people… it’s impossible [to govern]. That’s when the army’s role became more prominent, because we needed their help and we were working together for the same cause.”
“They [Army] have been in power for so many years, but there needs to be a balance. To think the army will be shunted out of politics is not possible. Using their constructive power can get this country out of institutional collapse.”

Let’s now try and unpack this. I don’t have any independent information on whether the army chief wanted Aleem Khan as CM Punjab. What I do know from multiple sources is that the army was unhappy with Khan’s choice, namely Usman Buzdar. But it wasn’t a deal-breaker (or the rupture would have come much earlier.)

In any case, that’s not the issue I am interested in here. My interest, as things have unfolded, is in Khan’s approach to the army and how he must deal with that organisation.

Since his ouster in a no-confidence vote, he and his supporters have constantly and consistently attacked the army brass, arguing that while the army is essential for Pakistan and its defence, a few generals — especially the incumbent Chief — cannot be allowed to derail a peoples’ revolution. However, he has also been demanding that the army not be neutral and instead side with him (because this is the righteous cause.)

This two-pronged strategy was possible because of Khan’s support among a high percentage of veterans and a visceral loathing among the serving for PML-N’s ruling dynasty. As noted above, he knew and considered the army to be organised and disciplined. As is also clear, he understands that the army has been in power for long and it might not be possible to oust it from politics. But, there needs to be a balance. He is acknowledging, and it’s a fact, that the system he presided over was a hybrid and until the rupture it was working fine for both sides.

That said, he is also conflicted about sharing power. He thinks the coalition engineered for him was a hindrance. He says that if he does return to power, he won’t form a government unless he has a clear mandate. He also believes, as evidenced by his quote above, that he needed the army because he was hamstrung by his political allies. In a way it’s the same apropos of the army: he thought the army would help him cleanse the system. That didn’t happen because, as he alleges, the army controlled NAB and used cases against the politicians to manipulate them and the politics.

This indicates two contradictory strands in Khan’s thinking: on the one hand, he has shown a clear dislike for making compromises; on the other, he seems to understand that given the structural constraints of power in Pakistan, he needs to work with the army. It was this point that I highlighted in last week’s article: does the principal contradiction lie between the PTI and the PDM or does it lie between the various political actors and a dominant army?

From what we can see, Khan still seems more amenable to making a deal with the army than with other political leaders (his diatribes against Mr. X and Mr. Y notwithstanding). This is both ironic and deeply flawed. Here’s why. If the army does manipulate the system, it is almost inevitable that it will continue to do so. Moreover, depending on the circumstances, the Army can — and will — swing from one political actor to another. See, for example, the vote of no-confidence against Khan.

Corollary: if Khan does not make space for a dialogue with other political actors who have, at various times in the past, experienced the same fate as Khan’s, then for all his present struggle he will have misidentified the principal contradiction. If so, he will face the same constraints that hampered his agency last time round, if and when he ever returns to power.

There is another issue: Khan’s desire for unhampered power, not just in relation to the army but also other political actors. He wants to return to power with a crushing mandate so he can do what he wants to without worrying about coalition partners. This is understandable but problematic even if we were to subtract the army for the sake of the argument and consider the political power struggle as a contest purely among political players.

The United States midterm elections have manifested the divide in the US; the United Kingdom is split, as is France; AfD (Alternative for Germany), a rightwing party, is the biggest opposition in Bundestag. Chancellor Olaf Shultz sits atop a coalition government; the far-right Vox Party has entered a coalition regional government in Castilla y León; almost all the European countries have coalition governments; one can go on.

Yes, coalitions hamper. But if Russia had a coalition government right now, it would quite likely not have invaded Ukraine. The lack of restrictions on strongmen can be a blessing or a curse: it all depends on the strongman. But even if he is not Kim Jong-un or Vladimir Putin but a Lee Kuan Yew, the people will have to accept a trade-off, between prosperity and certain freedoms.

Khan is popular and since his ouster he seems to have won more adherents to his cause. He wants to return to power, which is legitimate. But he needs to assess his choices, not just in relation to the army and other political actors, but also with reference to his desire to bag a big mandate. Voting patterns only indicate where the voting population stands. If the elections are not manipulated, a divided population will send a divided mandate to parliament.

Lesson: politics, for the most part, is about aggregating conflicting and often contradictory interests.

The writer is interested in security and foreign policies