Asad Riaz Bhatti

Perpetual dilemma in Pakistan

Even by Pakistan’s continuously volatile political norms, the previous 13 weeks in the nation have been particularly chaotic. After a no-confidence vote ousted Imran Khan from office on April 11, 2022, Pakistan established a new government. There were dramatic and mysterious weeks leading up to the ballot, from March 8 to April 10. The nation is currently in an economic and political crisis. Shahbaz Sharif’s new administration is struggling to find its feet. At the same time, the deposed prime minister spearheads protests around the nation criticizing the government’s legitimacy and pushing for new elections. Pakistan is experiencing a severe climatic emergency. Not alone are political tensions rising; Pakistan has been engulfed in an incredible political heat wave for weeks.

Comprehending how Khan’s administration collapsed is critical to understanding the present issue. A no-confidence vote removed Khan as Pakistan’s prime minister and was uable to complete the five-year term of parliament like his successors. APDM (All Pakistan Democratic Movement) had been demanding Khan’s resignation ever since he took office and referred to him as “selected” by the authorities rather than “elected” by the people. The opposition gained traction this spring. On the surface, they attacked Khan for governance and economic failures. Two small parties in Khan’s governing alliance defected to the opposition, depriving him of his razor-thin majority in the National Assembly.

Khan devised a conspiracy theory to blame for his government’s demise, alleging, without proof, U.S. “regime change” for pursuing an “independent foreign policy” and blaming “local abettors” – charges that Pakistan’s National Security Committee has rejected. However, Khan and his associates are blaming the “neutrals” for his departure, sometimes in veiled language, sometimes more openly.

But Khan’s dismissal has galvanized his fans. In massive rallies around the country, he repeatedly refers to the new government as an “imported government”. Khan has utilized demonstrations and interviews to get media attention, claiming that the collapse of his administration reinstated the corrupt politicians who are to blame for Pakistan’s troubles. His fans, many of whom are middle-class, young, and urban and outraged by Khan’s unceremonious, staged removal, repeat his statements on social media. Khan’s narrative of grievances tries to undermine the legitimacy of the new administration; his party withdrew from parliament, and he is pushing for recent elections.

In contrast, many of the government’s constituent parties saw Khan’s leaving as democratic and his ideas as hazardous. Pakistan now has shades of the post-January 6 division in the United States, with each party seeing no truth in the other’s claims. Khan’s fans, in particular, are sceptical of whatever the new administration says.

Headed by Shahbaz Sharif of the PML-N, the new administration confronts severe difficulties –not only from Khan. Shahbaz Sharif’s brother, three-time former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was ousted in 2017 on corruption accusations and currently resides in London, continues to wield enormous power inside the party and the government. Shahbaz has always played second fiddle to the more flamboyant Nawaz throughout his political career. The prime minister and his senior comrades in his cabinet travelled to London on short notice to speak with Nawaz on the future of the new administration. While they were away, Pakistan’s economy deteriorated. The rupee’s steep fall against the dollar continued, and the stock market lost value.

The administration must decide whether to retain the expensive, unsustainable fuel subsidies instituted by Khan’s government, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) wants to abolish as a condition for extending Pakistan’s loan program. Contributions would undoubtedly be unpopular which concerns a government with a short time in power until the next election. So far, the administration has paused, stating earlier this week that it will retain subsidies over the advice of its finance minister (for now).

Shahbaz’s general reticence is likely due to respect for Nawaz and his staff. They may have opposing ideas and the reality that he leads an unwieldy coalition of rival parties that will compete in the next election. However, part of the hesitancy stems from the PDM’s primary purpose was to depose Khan; they did not have an alternative governance plan or economic strategy before assuming power. This lack of planning is now manifesting in the face of Pakistan’s economic catastrophe.

The scheduling of the next election, which must be conducted by the summer of 2023, is a significant source of political instability in Pakistan. Khan has said unambiguously that he intends to ride his current momentum to quick elections. He attempted to deny the then-opposition a foothold in government by extra-constitutionally dissolving parliament, a move that Pakistan’s Supreme Court overturned. For its part, the incoming administration may utilize its time in office to turn things around, including settling pending corruption charges.

The issue is whether Nawaz would be able to return to Pakistan before the next election. If he does, the PML-N’s following will grow, but if he is not prosecuted upon his return, Khan’s claim that the Sharifs have politically manipulated the corruption charges against them will strengthen. The PML-N also confronts significant challenges, including an economic crisis driven partly by external circumstances, a power struggle in Punjab, and a president who belongs to and is loyal to Khan’s party. The coalition administration recently said that it would not hold early elections; former President Asif Ali Zardari has urged that polls be postponed until parliament can implement electoral reform.

Whatever the result of the next election might be, it is far from certain. In Pakistan’s parliamentary system, the party with the most “electable” – influential politicians in local seats — on their side wins. Large urban demonstrations may witness Khan’s popularity, but they do not always predict how his party would do in legislative elections.

Underneath the fierce continuing political tug of war in Pakistan, the basics of the system remain the same. Ultimately Pakistan’s escalating political tensions are an opportunistic quest for power. It has created a political tinderbox in the nation. Moreover, none of this considers the continuous suffering of regular Pakistanis, who continue to pay the price for the country’s lengthy history of political instability.