Ukraine goes on the offensive

Ukraine’s counteroffensive, which began on September 6, has inflicted a significant operational blow on the Russian military, recapturing nearly all of Kharkiv Oblast, including the operationally important city of Izyum. The offensive took the Russian military by surprise, which was expecting the main offensive to come against Kherson in the south and had redeployed forces from the east to the south. (see Kharkiv offensive map, courtesy @War_Mapper)

While the war, by no means, is over and Russia will most certainly respond to try and degrade Ukrainian forces and retake lost territory, the Ukrainian counteroffensive, by all journalistic and military-assessment accounts, marks a significant success for Ukrainian military since the Battle of Kyiv in February/March, which had blunted the main Russian offensive and forced it to withdraw its forces from that theatre and focus on the Donbas region.

Russia’s reverses in Kharkiv Oblast and Ukrainian gains are also conceded by Russia where TV channel discussions continue to debate the whys and wherefores of Russian rout. The influential community of Russian mil-bloggers is also debating the reverses and blaming the country’s Ministry of Defence and Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu. Many observers have noted that this is an attempt by President Vladimir Putin to distance himself from what’s happening on the ground.

How did it come about?

It began in the south, in Kherson. As reports indicated, Ukrainian leaders and military commanders were overtly discussing an offensive against Kherson, a city strategically important to both sides. There was also Ukrainian force concentration in the Kherson theatre and they were continuously engaging the Russian forces through long-range artillery and shallow, localised offensives. The most important platform/system was HIMARS; the system was used to attack and degrade Russian ground lines of communication in both the Kherson theatre as well as in Kharkiv Oblast.

As late as September 2, just four days before the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv — north and east — President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had issued a public warning to Russian forces to “run away” from Kherson. Everyone, not just the Russians, fell for the feint (which, incidentally, has grown more than just a feint after the Kharkiv successes). Immediately after Zelenskyy’s statement, reports indicated heavy artillery barrages against Russian forces in Kherson, declaring that the impending offensive was the bellwether of Ukraine’s first major counteroffensive of the war.

This was also believable because of Kherson’s location. The city lies on the north-western bank of Dnipro River (also spelled Dnieper). The river slices Ukraine into two parts — east and west — as it flows roughly north to south connecting Kyiv to the Black Sea. The Kherson Oblast itself straddles the river to the east and west. Retaking the city not only means forcing Russian forces into losing a major city — the first they captured — but also, if Ukraine can muster enough forces, forcing them into retreat, making their presence in the theatre untenable and regaining the agri belt. It would also constitute an important operational phase for recapturing Mariupol, which is not only significant as a port on Azov Sea but also crucial for Russia as it provides the much-sought land bridge between Crimea and the Donbas.

The Kherson feint was also credible because Russian forces could be pushed up against the river and any concentration of forces would become more vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery. As Jack Watling noted in an article for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), “The river, meanwhile, prevents the Russians from counterattacking in the Ukrainian’s flank, and interdiction of supplies moving across Kherson’s bridges can prevent the city’s defenders from being effectively circulated or reinforced.”

The main counteroffensive, however, came in Kharkiv Oblast where Russian defences had been thinned because of redeployment to Kherson. The Ukrainian manoeuvre has been described by some observers as a masterstroke. But these are many battles in a war that has already lasted for seven months and will likely drag on into 2023. For instance, it will be interesting to see how far and long the Ukrainian military will be able to sustain the momentum in the northeast. Russian planners will probably do well to “re-establish a tenable defensive line and possibly even conduct localised counterattacks”.

Be that as it may, the important point to consider, now that Ukraine has shown its resolve and intention to go on the offensive, is that offensive is always more demanding and costly than defending tenable lines and positions.

How will it likely unfold here on out?

Three factors are important, one political, the other two military-operational. Politically, it is imperative for Kyiv to show its performance on the ground to justify the massive military aid and support it is getting from US-NATO-EU states. Russia has already halted gas supplies and warned the EU states of a very cold winter. Energy prices have drastically gone up and Europeans will have to brace for high energy bills as well as gas rationing. The states’ resolve to continue supporting Kyiv must, domestically, remain aligned with public mood and morale.

So far the Ukrainian military and volunteers have performed impressively against an adversary which had a massive initial asymmetric advantage against Kyiv.

The second factor, and the first of the military-operational ones, is to continue to attrit the Russian forces and deny them any opportunity to reorganise/rebuild momentum for offensive operations or consolidate defences in areas under their control. Thirdly, and linked with the second factor, the Ukrainian military has to plan and execute their own offensives to liberate territory under Russian control. That would require selecting strategic nodes against which to apply force in order to gain synergies. This is where attrition and manoeuvre warfare intersect.

As noted before, offensive operations are always more demanding and costly. They require patient planning, build-up and execution. Even when a small force can actually score a breakthrough, the attacking force requires fresh troops to hold the territory and exploit. Depending on the manpower available to the Ukrainian military, its losses in men and material and how soon it can replenish its losses, it should be obvious that the leadership would need to husband and utilise its resources — both men and material — judiciously.

Some reports indicate that the Ukrainians might now go for a push against Kherson, originally used as a feint. According to the Institute for the Study of War, “Ukrainian forces have reportedly attacked and made gains at several important locations on the western bank of the Dnipro River. They have cut the two bridges across the river and continue to keep them cut as well as interfere with Russian efforts to maintain supply via barge and pontoon ferry.”

If the Ukrainian forces manage to regain Kherson city, it will be interesting to see if they can exploit that gain. Jack Watling thinks that “seizing Kherson – while politically significant – would not enable rapid exploitation operations to occupy territory on the east bank of the Dnipro, because the Ukrainians would suffer from the same challenges with supplies over a small number of damaged bridges as the Russians, and would therefore risk outrunning their artillery support.”

Further, there is the issue of whether Ukraine has enough troops and reserves to launch and sustain offensives both in the Kherson theatre as well as in the Donbas. Overreaching generally gets punished, as Russians have learnt. Would Ukraine fall into the same trap?

The writer is interested in security and foreign policies