US-China diplomacy

When Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, met U.S. Ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, late last week, there was some degree of American awareness about why the relationship mattered. Consideration of stronger communication was evident, but such a way forward doesn’t seem to mirror actual U.S. priorities towards China. That is the fundamental discord that Burns – as the U.S. ambassador to China – must help overcome to meet China halfway and render U.S. intent towards Beijing credible.

To get a pulse of divergent U.S. priorities, look back to August. In a CNN interview, Burns defended Washington’s flagrant violations of the one-China principle, and accused Beijing of serving as an “agent of instability” in the Taiwan Strait. “There is a lot of concern around the world that China has now become an agent of instability in the Taiwan Strait and that’s not in anyone’s interest,” claimed Burns at the time. “Is [the Chinese government] going to react in an aggressive and violent way to disturb the peace?”

Attempts to deflect gross U.S. interference over Taiwan deserve to be called out. After all, the international consensus on the Taiwan Strait is virtually the opposite of what the U.S. has touted for long. Scores of countries firmly adhere to the one-China principle and have reaffirmed their resolve in the face of flagrant U.S. ‘one-China’ violations. Ironically, if there is any room for “concern” around the world, it should identify chiefly with U.S. attempts to court separatists in the name of “one-China” compliance, as demonstrated by unwarranted Congressional visits to Taiwan and remarks from the country’s strategic quarters.

By virtue of U.S. overreach into China’s clearly drawn sovereign redlines, the Taiwan Strait has seen a marked rise in instability, mirrored by serious concerns across Asia, including among some U.S. partners. All this was conveniently lost on Burns’ anti-China invective, but it doesn’t need to be this way.

Let’s also be clear: it is the U.S. – not China – that insists on preparing the ground for instability by pressing unauthorized trade links and arms sales with the Chinese region, despite repeated warnings from Beijing. As a result, the allegation that it is somehow “incumbent upon” China to “convince the rest of the world that it will act peacefully” won’t hold up. Wang Yi’s high-profile call with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken this week is a fitting illustration of the need to manage the US-China rivalry, as opposed to intensifying it. Emphasis on the latter risks coming across as a poorly veiled U.S. attempt to justify its overt, sustained and increasingly counterproductive provocations in the Taiwan Strait. That trajectory stands to benefit no one.

Understand, that if the U.S. is so genuinely concerned about avoiding instability in the Taiwan Strait, the solution is simple: Washington should come clean on noninterference in China’s sovereign matters. That means an end to tacit support for sanctioned secessionists within U.S. boundaries, banning all links with the Chinese province, and exercising zero exception to the ironclad consensus enshrined within the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués.

The U.S. envoy will be better positioned to speak to the views of the international community once the country has put its original commitments into action, particularly on the Taiwan Strait. After all, it is an unfortunate fact that flagrant violations by Washington have been central to rising instability in the Taiwan Strait. Burns’ latest exchange offered little acknowledgement of documented U.S. provocations. Instead, his original view that the U.S. demonstrates readiness to meet China “halfway” and “discuss their differences” was a step in the right direction, but short of a leap since U.S. defense priorities diverge from that intent.

China is all for cooperation and management of US-China competition. Wang’s frank and direct communication with Blinken is the latest confirmation that Beijing prioritizes to put all stakes on the negotiating table. Beijing is aware that sustained diplomacy keeps a meaningful future in sight.

It is here that the U.S. must reciprocate by admitting that the Taiwan question is China’s internal matter and will always be. A conscious lack of U.S. adherence to its own one-China policy has given strength to confrontational tendencies within Washington, when the future demands greater alignment with international expectations. Can the U.S. avoid bringing US-China relations to new lows and lifting tensions to new highs?

Burns’ earlier view offers some clues. The U.S. envoy previously made clear that Washington does not believe “there should be a crisis in US-China relations.” It makes for good talk, but the role played by U.S. House Speaker’s unwarranted Taiwan visit was itself a recipe for misunderstanding and grave miscalculation. As such, there is no credibility to the allegations that there was a “manufactured crisis by the government in Beijing” in the aftermath of the visit. Again, not a trace of evidence provided, but a massive split between Washington’s do-good rhetoric and dangerous anti-China propaganda has become all too clear in the past. To affect a shift, it is the U.S. that has to make up for lost ground and plug the credibility vacuum.

Ultimately, the Burns-Wang exchange should be seen as an extended lifeline to mature communication between two big powers. Compelling proof that the U.S. remains the central irritant to peace and stability in the Strait continues to come in, but China’s desire to put the relationship on a solid track creates an opening for a level-playing field.

The writer is a foreign affairs commentator and recipient of the Fulbright Award