Washington’s turn to the Indo-Pacific

Having long considered itself as both an Asian and Pacific power, United States unveiled its latest document entitled “Indo-Pacific Strategy” that outlines the basic objectives and principle of this policy along with steps that US would take to implement it over the next few years.

President Biden’s predecessor, President Donald Trump, in his “shared vision” document released in 2019 had described the rationale for U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region in the following words:

“With $1.9 trillion in two-way trade, our futures are inextricably intertwined. U.S. government agencies, businesses, and institutions are spurring private sector investment and gainful employment in infrastructure, energy, and the digital economy, strengthening civil society and democratic institutions, countering transnational threats, and investing in human capital across the Indo-Pacific…. The United States, our allies, and our partners are at the forefront of preserving the free and open regional order. All nations have a shared responsibility to uphold the rules and values that underpin a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Building upon these interests, the second iteration of Indo-Pacific strategy defines the region as “stretching from our Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean” which “is home to more than half of the world’s people, nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy, and seven of the world’s largest militaries.”

It notes more members of the U.S. military are based in the region than in any other outside the United States. It supports more than three million American jobs and is the source of nearly $900 billion in foreign direct investment in the United States.

Looking ahead, it posits that the region “will drive as much as two-thirds of global economic growth. Its influence will only grow—as will its importance to the United States.”

Successive U.S. regimes have recognized the Indo-Pacific region as vital to American security and prosperity and this bipartisan support undergirds the latest version of Indo-Pacific strategy. The document departs from previous versions in one significant respect, namely, the rise of China.

As the document notes: “This intensifying American focus is due in part to the fact that the Indo-Pacific faces mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC. The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power. The PRC’s coercion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific. From the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbours in the East and South China Seas, our allies and partners in the region bear much of the cost of the PRC’s harmful behaviour. In the process, the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.”

Recognizing the limits of U.S power to change the assertive behaviour of PRC, the documents notes that “Our objective is not to change the PRC, but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favourable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share. We will also seek to manage competition with the PRC responsibly.”

The strategy aims to promote specific goals. These include: advance a free and open Indo-Pacific; build connections within and beyond the region; drive regional prosperity; bolster Indo-Pacific security; build regional resilience to transnational threats.

In pursuit of these goals, the document uses the framework of regional cooperative security, QUAD and AUKUS to build an Indo-Pacific region in which each country is a stakeholder that deals with traditional and non-traditional threats and challenges lying ahead.

The document realises that U.S leadership is a critical factor in building this community and its capacities to adequately deal with myriad of old security and new challenges like COVID–19. Yet, it also realises that Washington cannot be the sole source of power needed to combat the array of formidable challenges faced by the countries located in the Indo-Pacific region. It then singles out QUAD and AUKUS as two leading mechanisms through which some of these collective challenges can be met.

The document says: “We will strengthen the Quad as a premier regional group and ensure it delivers on issues that matter to the Indo-Pacific. The Quad will play a leading regional role on COVID-19 response and global health security, delivering on its investment to provide an additional one billion vaccines to the region and to the world. It will advance work on critical and emerging technologies, driving supply-chain cooperation, joint technology deployments, and advancing common technology principles. The Quad will build a green shipping network and will coordinate the sharing of satellite data to improve maritime domain awareness and climate responses.”

As a member of QUAD, it views India’s role as a “net provider of security”. It goes on to say that Washington “will continue to build a strategic partnership in which the United States and India work together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia; collaborate in new domains, such as health, space, and cyber space; deepen our economic and technology cooperation; and contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific. We recognize that India is a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia, a driving force of the Quad and other regional fora, and an engine for regional growth and development.”

Apart from outsourcing security to India in the Indian Ocean region, the document says when it comes to providing security to the whole Indo-Pacific region United States will remain committed to “enhancing our capabilities to defend our interests as well as to deter aggression and to counter coercion against U.S. territory and our allies and partners. Integrated deterrence will be the cornerstone of our approach. We will more tightly integrate our efforts across war fighting domains and the spectrum of conflict to ensure that the United States, alongside our allies and partners, can dissuade or defeat aggression in any form or domain. We will drive initiatives that reinforce deterrence and counter coercion, such as opposing efforts to alter territorial boundaries or undermine the rights of sovereign nations at sea. We will renew our focus on innovation to ensure the U.S. military can operate in rapidly evolving threat environments, including space, cyberspace, and critical and emerging technology areas. We are developing new concepts of operations, building more resilient command and control, increasing the scope and complexity of our joint exercises and operations, and pursuing diverse force-posture opportunities that will strengthen our ability to operate forward flexibly with allies and partners.”

Consistent with our broader strategic approach, we will prioritize our single greatest asymmetric strength: our network of security alliances and partnerships. Across the region, the United States will work with allies and partners to deepen our interoperability and develop and deploy advanced war-fighting capabilities as we support them in defending their citizens and their sovereign interests. (emphasis added).

It is obvious that the main purpose of the Indo-Pacific document is to lead the entire region away from China and enmesh countries in a network of security arrangements that would only place United States in an advantageous position in the intensifying Sino-American competition.

The writer is a political scientist and defence analyst