Hamzah Hussain

30th Oct, 2022. 09:05 am

Whither Balochistan’s insurgency

When the debate over Pakistan’s largest province subsides, it will be clear that Balochistan’s insurgency was a product of nefarious designs of countries seeking to undermine the write of the state. My trip to the province in August 2022 helped build a perspective whereby the issue does not solely stem from Baloch nationalists seeking to rebel against the Pakistani state, but more of spoilers in the entire peace process. Insurgent activity, should hence not be viewed as an anomaly, but a systematic operational technique with the objective of delivering a message to the wider target audience.

The insurgency which started off as the Balochistan Liberation Army in its nascent stages is now as ‘BRAS’ or Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar’ which is an amalgamation of different insurgent groups under an umbrella. The combination includes the BLA, the Balochistan Liberation Front and the Balochistan Republican Army which have been active since 2019. Their merger opens up a dangerous front as the previously scattered insurgency is now a potent force and a monolithic entity with resources, expertise and capacity being directed at the Pakistani state. Its potency stems from stronger, unified command which have made them even more difficult to deal with.

Most Baloch leaders denounce violence and have distanced themselves from BRAS. Nationalist politicians such as Sanaullah Baloch for example did not link the grievances of the people and political leadership of Balochistan with the need to attack the Pakistani state. Most also agreed that groups such as BRAS which have been recently formed, have been actively funded, trained and promoted by foreign intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing of India (RAW) and the National Directorate of Security of Afghanistan (NDS) due to poor policy making, neglect and callousness from the Islamabad security establishment.

The linkage between foreign funding, training and weaponisation and BRAS must be understood in order for conclusions to be drawn on why attacks have taken place so brazenly. On Chinese investments for example, Baloch insurgents will employ violence to target the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which has been a longstanding objective of Pakistan’s rival and neighbour India. The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in India for example, coincided with heightened rhetoric from Narendra Modi in different platforms across the world to undercut Pakistan’s writ on the province and call for separatists to rebel against the state. The inauguration of the ‘Free Balochistan’ office in New Delhi as well as Narendra Modi’s speech on India’s Independence Day delivered in 2015 is testament to his very fact. While speaking of Balochistan, Modi, a right-wing Hindu nationalist championed India’s role in providing support to the Mukti Bahini rebels in the erstwhile East Pakistan which is an open endorsement of separatism.

Alongside political endorsement comes the weaponisation of BRAS. The arrest of Indian naval officer Kulbhushan Yadav in March 2016 revealed harrowing details of the subversive role that Indian agents have played in the province and across Pakistan. The Indian doctrine of ‘Arthashastra’ is still operational and speaks of promoting state expansion, controlling neighbouring states such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Bhutan through coercion and the direct use of force by Indian forces/ intelligence agencies. The Indian funding of the LTTE (Lanka Tamil Tiger Eelam) as a prelude to the 1987 IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) being deployed in Sri Lanka for example was a classic, quintessential intervention which only exasperated the problem and contributed to greater unrest in the Sinhalese dominated island. Similarly, in Balochistan, the Kautliya doctrine is very much visible as the ability to brazenly attack Chinese academics in Karachi by groups associated with, abetted by or being an integral part of, BRAS is not possible without Indian financial support.

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Funding primarily takes place through Indian consulates in Jalalabad in Afghanistan as well as Kandahar. The funding is a systematic and multi-layered process given that India’s activities in the 2000s involves creating an Islamic State (ISIS) chapter in Pakistan by relocating 30 Daesh militants from India to the Pakistan border. Through consulates and foreign platforms ripe to employ nefarious designs, RAW has launched radio and live broadcasts in the Baloch language for online listeners, particularly the youth to benefit from Indian propaganda ranging from discrimination against the Baloch population from the Pakistani state, and suppression of indigenous economic rights through the operationalisation of CPEC.

To date, the province has witnessed five insurgencies, namely, 1948, 1958, 1962, 1973-77 and 2002. In 2009, the insurgency morphed into a new movement when UNHCR representative David Solecki was kidnapped from Quetta which resulted in three Baloch nationalist leaders being killed in Turbat in the same year. However, it was in 2002 when covert funding and abetting of the Baloch insurgency started by RAW. This includes the development of tangible infrastructure, promoting of connections and relationships, setting up fifty-eight training institutes, supply of both small and heavy weight weapons to the insurgents, the development of a modern communication network and provision of heavy funds.

That said, the Baloch nationalist leadership must be taken on board as alienation of people’s representatives will play into the hands of BRAS. The lack of accommodation of a diverse range of perspectives on Balochistan has been a massive problem in Pakistan where Islamabad centric policy making only contributing to the anxiety and animosity. Such a fertile ground should not be provided to disruptive forces to exploit with impunity and policy making on development as well as CPEC must be indigenous in their approach. The neutralisation of the Baloch insurgency and its funding can materialise, but only if the Pakistani state shows some strategic foresight.

The writer is an Assistant Research Associate at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute

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