‘We misquote the Quaid, believing if we write faith before unity, we will become better Muslims’

(Retd) Lt. Gen. Tariq Khan

Interview

Even nine years after his retirement from the Pakistan Army, Lt. General Tariq Khan continues to create waves with his incisive, insightful writing and bold, candid comments and interviews on traditional and social media.

He regularly contributes hard-hitting articles for leading publications and social media platforms on issues ranging from national security and terrorism to corruption and the task of nation building.   

A recipient of the Sword of Honour at the Pakistan Military Academy, in the years that followed, Lt. Gen. Tariq Khan was known and respected for not just being a highly decorated officer, but also as a bold and courageous commander, who played a pivotal role in Pakistan’s war against terrorism in some of the most challenging years, especially from 2007-10. He held several crucial command positions, including those of Commander of the 1st Strike Corps at Mangla and Inspector General (IG) of the Frontier Corps (FC). He led his troops from the front as IG FC in the war against terrorism, and has the distinction of having been awarded the Hilal-e-Imtiaz. He also served as Pakistan’s senior representative at CENTCOM, Tampa, Florida from 2004-05 and was the first Pakistan Army General conferred with the ‘Legion of Merit’ by the United States Government for his meritorious services at CENTCOM.

Since his retirement, he has been serving on the honorary faculty of the National Defence University as a senior mentor. He also possesses vast experience as adviser to leading corporate entities. Bol News talks to General Tariq Khan on Pakistan’s peace talks with the TTP and the challenge of terrorism.

Pakistan is holding talks with the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Is it a good idea? Some leading analysts see it as a concession to the group.

Lt. Gen. Retd. Tariq Khan (TK): Negotiating with terrorists is internationally avoided by all countries. It implies giving into violence and rewarding militancy. Yes, there are examples of negotiated settlements in such conflicts, but each case needs to be studied separately as circumstances vary.

Invariably such negotiations by a State are conducted from a position of strength, never from a weak position. Nevertheless, in keeping with international norms, history and tradition, negotiating with terrorists (in this particular example) is not a recommended process.  Holding talks or negotiations is always a two-way process and involves the element of give and take. The principal positions are usually flexible and there are compromises made by either side for the greater good. And what is the greater good? This should be clearly defined and the cost to acquire it must be ascertained. This defined ‘greater good’ is the objective of negotiations. Red-lines must be established and should be non-negotiable. In the case of talks with the TTP, there are questions that need to be answered:

1. The TTP is a defeated force comprising 5000 to 7000 individuals, who have been forced to vacate territories of Pakistan and resettle in Afghanistan. Why does the State feel compelled to negotiate with them? It could be the fear that hostile external agencies may get access to them and exploit the situation, proliferating violence and terrorism, causing instability at the national level. Yet, these militants were defeated in the best of days when the CIA and RAW were actively supporting them. Why should such support to them by hostile elements now become a matter of concern, or one that cannot be dealt with? The point is that they are still vulnerable, cannot stand up to the State and must be dealt with the way terrorists should be.
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2. Who in the government is insisting on talking to them? Where was this initiative generated?
3. What compromises is the State willing to make in order to accommodate the TTP in these negotiations? Who is sanctioning these compromises?

What in your view compelled Pakistan to opt for talks with the TTP despite the solid gains made on the ground?

TK: This is what has not been understood by the general public and the government needs to explain it to the people. However, in my opinion, based upon my experience, these matters are usually dealt with by an intelligence agency. Incompetent leadership at all levels is ‘briefed’ by intelligence agencies and led by the nose into approving a course of action. In fact, if the leadership had any standing, they would direct and task the intelligence agency concerned, not get briefed and influenced by them. The tasking, if done correctly, would lead to a set of questions that need answers, and the conclusion of which would help the leadership to decide on a course of action properly deliberated upon, with its consequences accounted for. In this case, it is obvious that this has not been done and the intelligence agency has been left to its own devices.

Why do you think the TTP is insisting that the merger of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa be revoked?

TK: So that these militants can have an independent territory from which they can freely administer and govern in accordance with their own values, system and code of governance. Though not having any part in the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the TTP have allowed themselves to believe that it was a great strategic victory and that they had substantially contributed to it.

But this is not true. The TTP is not a political force. It has always been a criminal group. However, circumstances have allowed them to re-invent themselves and acquire a new role. So the clarion cry from here on for them would be Sharia, Islam and the Ummah. Acquiring FATA as a separate state would give them bragging rights that they too won a victory over a large army like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan won against the United States and its allies.

Demands from both sides are apparently tough. Pakistan wants the TTP to lay down weapons and accept the country’s constitution. The TTP wants the semi-autonomous status of the tribal areas restored, and the imposition of ‘Sharia’ according to their interpretation. Can there be a middle-ground between the two positions?

TK: Pakistan’s demands are not tough at all. What the State of Pakistan is demanding is natural; to be a citizen of a country, one must accept the constitution, not carry weapons as an organised group and follow the law. What is tough about this?

What the TTP is demanding, on the other hand, is ridiculous. They want Pakistan to hand over its integral territory to them — for no apparent reason. It implies that a defeated force — forced to flee — will through a negotiated settlement take over a piece of sovereign territory in a gesture of surrender by the State, thus creating a new independent State. Even if this were done, which is almost impossible, what is there then to stop similar demands in Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, Kashmir and Sindh etc.?

The Afghan Taliban are facilitating the Pakistan-TTP talks. How do you see this? Why can’t the Afghan Taliban just deny the TTP the space to operate from Afghanistan?

TK: An arbitrator is always accepted as the bigger of the two belligerents. Why has the State of Pakistan accepted Siraj Haqqani as someone who has the capacity, the clout and the standing of being an arbitrator in a matter that Pakistan can settle on its own? Pakistan should tell the Afghans to give the TTP citizenship and keep them in their country, and not act as their representatives or spokesmen. If Afghanistan cannot contain terrorism emanating from their soil that may be affecting Pakistan, then they should be prepared for the consequences of the response.

Is the TTP a monolithic group with a centralised command, or is it more like an umbrella organisation comprising different tribal factions?

TK: The TTP comprises different tribes, groups and individuals held together by a central authority. However, the potential for splinter independent groups and breakaway factions exists, depending upon the size of the bone thrown to them. They all have a price. This is what our own intelligence stalwarts exploit. Such intelligence operators find a group ready to break away. And the operator makes his career move of ‘bringing in’ a hostile group to surrender. This surrender implies that the breakaway faction demands its own pound of flesh. They are usually adjusted as ‘Aman’ (Peace) Committees, furnished with unregistered black Vigos and armed with unlicensed weapons. They are then let loose on the people from where they generate revenue through coercion and terror as government representatives. It is a stupid idea and an exercise that is resented to by the people and must be stopped immediately.

Can the talks with Pakistan create a wedge in this hardline group?

TK: It may create a wedge, but at the cost of the people we are trying to protect, and the wedge is always removed by local deals later. Hafiz Gul Bahadar is a good example. How many times did he become a government tout and how many times did he return to his old companions and ways?

In the past Pakistani authorities made a number of accords with militants. What was the result in a nutshell?

TK: No accord ever held. They all failed. Both sides blamed each other for being untruthful and violating the agreement. In my opinion, the officials from the government are never clear as to what is being agreed to and miss the important details in the agreement, while the tribesmen believe they managed a better deal through tricking the officials. The agreement thus becomes vague and ambiguous. It leads to misunderstanding, mistrust and a total lack of faith. This is probably why such agreements never succeeded.

The prime example is the (2009) peace deal with Sufi Muhammed in Swat. The agreement allowed Sufi Muhammed authority and constitutional rights over all of the Malakand Division. This included Buner, Chitral, Dir, Bajaur along with Swat. Why was Malakand Division as a whole agreed to instead of only Swat Valley? The people of Chitral etc. did not want to be governed by Sufi Muhammed; who gave the government the right to surrender those people to Sufi Muhammed? When those people did not agree, it led to a reopening of the conflict. The government accused Sufi Muhammed of going beyond the agreed mandate and space, while the cleric complained that the authorities violated the agreement by not handing over all of Malakand.

Can the foot soldiers and mid-rank leaders within the TTP be rehabilitated? How can the government at least facilitate those who want to return home and live a normal life?

TK: A criminal must be dealt with as a criminal. There should be no compromises. If the State does not want to deal with these criminals, then it should be done through jirgas. These jirgas must not be a joke that the government cobbled together recently. The respective tribes must be allowed to establish the jirga on the basis of RAWAJ. Justice would be dispensed by such jirgas related to the crimes committed by each individual of the tribe who had joined the TTP. Complainants could take their complaints to the relevant jirgas for them to dispose of the issues at hand. It would usually involve blood money, expulsion from the tribe (a very serious matter) or even execution. There are people in the country who may not agree to jirga law under the present circumstances, so for them the alternative is that such criminals be tried by conventional law through special courts established for speedy dispensation.

You personally played a leading role in the war against terrorism from 2007-10 and even after that. What is the difference or commonality between the militants of your times and the ones who are active now?

TK: A militant is a militant regardless of his colour, creed, religion or nationality. He is essentially the same now as he was then. Some new weapons may have come into the use of the militants, but by-and-large they are still the same.

Do you think that Pakistan has managed to consolidate any of the gains made on the battlefield in the once troubled tribal areas through administrative measures? Have the people started to enjoy at least some fruits of development, progress and employment?

TK: No special gains have been made due to administrative indifference. The military can never win a war in its own country and never claims to have done so. It can only create an environment conducive for the civil administration to ‘win the peace.’ This has not happened, mainly because of a lack of funds and resources. As such, nothing has come by the way of the conflict zone in terms of progress, opportunity-building or development.

What kind of administrative and development measures would help to strengthen peace efforts?

TK: Some of the development that can easily be done is:

1. Modern education for all.
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2. The establishment of polytechnic institutions affiliated with international guilds and certification for skilled labour to be exported.
3. The establishment of a food-processing industry and cold storages.
4. Manufacturing: cement and stone
5. The provision of hydroelectricity.
6. Mineral development plans.
7. Organising and establishing the marble industry.
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8. Sports promotion.
9. Individual political relevance in local administration.

Overall, how grave is the challenge of terrorism for Pakistan now?

TK: Terrorism is a challenge to every country. To contain the threat is to be able to put in place measures and procedures that help protect the country. The Rule of Law must be supreme and equal to all. Exploitation of dissident groups will always be there and must be addressed. However, terrorism is always the product of hostile agencies and very rarely a home-grown initiative. Home-grown dissatisfied groups may be exploited, but the funding, resourcing, direction and training is always external and hostile elements will always be involved. Pakistan needs to recognise this threat, its source and from where it is emanating and then deal with it effectively. The means to deal with it is a separate study that cannot be put into this limited space.

Has the National Action Plan (NAP) lost its relevance or is there a need to revive it?

TK: Countries, nations and societies that want to do the right thing do not need laws or regulatory authorities. The NAP was dead the day it was made, and remained dysfunctional. Reviving it will only be useful if the State has the political will to follow the course. Otherwise it will always be an exercise in futility.

The Pakistani authorities cannot even implement garbage disposal rules or basic traffic laws. How does one expect that laws and organisations dealing with terrorism will function when in the hands of these people, who are so indifferent to anything that requires their attention related to regulations, rules and procedures?

Extremism is often seen as the first step which may lead towards terrorism. Some analysts say that the overall extremist mindset has grown in Pakistan. Your take please?

TK: Of course it has. No one minds his own business and is busy minding the affairs of others. People interfere in the temporal affairs of society, mutilating history and the origin of one’s ancestry. We build monuments for people such as Qadri, who murdered the Governor Punjab, and then elect a Parliament to represent us, which could not find the moral courage to even hold a prayer for their own fallen comrade, out of fear. We have a radicalised society that is intolerant of anybody else’s views. It is positional in its thinking and no logic, reason or rationale can contribute towards moderating these views. Steps to de-radicalise society must be taken as soon as possible. The easiest is to allow people the liberty to conduct themselves freely (within reasonable social norms) without interference from uneducated and poorly informed mobs. This would promote tourism, entertainment and amusement for the people who are denied true culture, tradition, custom and history. A nation cannot develop without culture but preservation of one’s own culture does not require contempt or disrespect for others

Can the revival of the NAP be an answer to the challenge of extremism?

TK: No, the law is. As long as an extremist keeps his ideas to himself and does not force them on to others, extremism is never a threat. The real answer to extremism is secular thought. Being secular does not mean not believing in religion. It simply means that everyone is entitled to his own belief which is no one else’s business. Negative extremism is easily dealt with by a proper education system, but unfortunately, in Pakistan, the education system has now become an accomplice to extremist thought by the type of curriculum and syllabi it is promoting, as well as the type of teachers we generally have.

The government in its bid to please the extremists have catered for them by allowing their views to permeate the education system. We have even misquoted the Quaid’s saying, ‘Unity, Faith and Discipline’ in the mistaken belief that if we write, Faith before Unity, we shall become better Muslims. We have failed to bring to our schools the famous statement of the Quaid that “You are free…. you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the state.”

But when there is no political or ideological will to even quote our own founder by the authorities of the time, then how can one deal with extremism?

How do you interpret the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) phenomenon? In the past, the establishment has accused it of working on a foreign agenda? Is it that simple?

TK: Of course it is being exploited by a foreign agency. It has picked up a cause. The cause is the product of the indecent haste shown in merging FATA with the KP. There were seminars and papers written by people like me, who kept saying that the merger should not be done in this manner since there will always be room for dissent and disagreement. Some of the main issues that were raised then in my paper were:

1. Learn from your experiences in creating the Malakand Division, which was a total disaster.
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2. If you want to do it, ask the people through a referendum, so that they are on board. The question must include: are they willing to be a part of KP, or remain an independent province.
3. If we are to enter the process of weaning FATA from the FCR by creating a province or through a merger, it must be a product of evolution and not immediate. It would involve at least two mushers from each agency (total of 14 elders) to form a Reform Committee at the Governor’s Secretariat, who would be assisted by constitutional experts to guide them in how to merge the Jirga Laws into the constitution. This would likely take five years or so.
4. The process would involve integrating the issues of NIQAT and Quami Zameen. Very complicated matters, the former dealing with tribal hierarchy and its standing, which is very important to the tribes and plays a role in recruitment, rewards and punishments based upon a tribal formula for proportional ratio and representation. The latter is related to revenue since no one really owns lands. These are only two issues but there are many more equally complicated ones.
5. The five years could also be used for developing infrastructure such as road communication, police stations, a judicial set-up, administrative offices and political constituencies, etc.
6. A financial outlay needs to be made public, which would show expenditure for at least the next five years and how this would be done.

Since none of these matters were addressed, we now have a dissident group exploited by hostile external agencies. We have given them a cause and a purpose, and now we are looking for answers. This was predicted in my paper. The paper is available and remains on the record.