Counter-Terrorism War 2.0

It appears that one of the theatres of this new hybrid warfare is going to be the Pak-Afghan border region

The region is heading towards a Counter-Terrorism War 2.0. In August 2021, when the Afghan Taliban regained control of Afghanistan after two decades of US-led NATO military presence, the countries of the region had already started re-thinking and re-adjustments in their respective strategies to combat the potential threats of terrorism, extremism and radicalism that could arise due to the change in Afghanistan. Over the past one-and-a-half-year, the situation in Afghanistan has continued to deteriorate with terrorism threatening regional peace and security.

Like the first phase of counter-terrorism war that followed the deployment of the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan in 2001, it appears that one of the active theatres of this new hybrid counter-terrorism warfare CTW 2.0 is once again going to be the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. While the situation resulting from such developments would directly affect the provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan bordering Afghanistan, the security and economic implications would be grave for the entire country.

The history of religious militancy and proliferation of violent groups in our society can be traced to the second-half of the 1970s when the manifestation of the US-Soviet Union super-power rivalry in Afghanistan led to funding of pro-Islamic jihadist groups to combat the power of communism. After the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, Jihad provided inspiration and romanticism to the bulging youth of Pakistan.

Ironically, while the state had supported the Afghan Jihad, it had no plan for managing its consequences in the society, and particularly the impact of religious radicalism on the youth in the following decades. Therefore, in the 1990s, Pakistan saw the emergence of violent and quasi-violent groups on the national political scene. There were occasions when the state apparatus not only ignored their often unlawful activities, but many times also provided them protection and patronage.

The post-9/11 developments and particularly the deployment of the US and NATO’s military mission in Afghanistan led to creation of a fertile ground for militant groups’ activities in Pakistan. Taking inspiration from the Afghan Taliban’s insurgency for restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), in 2007 a number of groups mostly based in Pakistan’s tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa came together under the banner of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). From the beginning, the TTP factions had established close operational linkages with the Afghan Taliban. No wonder, successive TTP Emirs took oath of allegiance to the Afghan Taliban’s supreme leader.

In the following years, the TTP developed an agenda of imposing Islamic Shariah in Pakistan. Pursuing this objective, the TTP carried out a wave of senseless violence, brutally targeting civilians as well as security personnel. While the TTP’s base from the beginning has been Pakistan’s tribal belt which has now been merged into Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, in recent years the group has also expanded its organizational structures to all the areas of the country. The violent activities of the group continued to become more intensive with attacks at the GHQ, Karachi Airport and targeting of senior military and police personnel.

Towards the end of 2014, a full-fledged military operation started against the TTP following the spike in such incidents, including the senseless attack on the Army Public School, Peshawar. It’s a fact that in the subsequent years the military operation weakened the outfit and its many commanders were either killed or fled to far flung tribal areas or across the border to Afghanistan. The TTP’s various factions and their commanders relocated in the Afghan provinces, bordering Pakistan and used their alliances with the Afghan Taliban and various other organisations, including ISKP, Al-Qaeda, ETIM, and IMU to continue their violent activities in Pakistan.

When the Afghan Taliban retook control of Afghanistan following a Doha based negotiation process, Pakistan’s expectation was that their government would fulfill the commitments for an inclusive political framework in Afghanistan and extend cooperation to other countries in efforts to eliminate terrorism and its support from the Afghan soil. However, later the talks with the TTP held with the support of the Afghan interim government did not yield any tenable outcome primarily due to the uncompromising demands of the militants.

An objective evaluation indicates that during the counter-terrorism efforts in the past decade, while military operations against the TTP led to remarkable successes in terms of restoring administrative control in the affected areas and curbing the capacities of these groups, a major shortcoming remained the lack of political, economic and social measures essential for the long-term sustainability of these gains. Though the National Action Plan (NAP) was adopted with enthusiasm, it did not translate into any meaningful practical actions. It’s not clear whether NACTA or any other counter-terrorism authority is actively monitoring the situation at the national and provincial levels. Resultantly, the anti-terrorism efforts continued without synchronization at the national level and without building up capacities of the provincial governments. The recent incidents in Lakki Marwat and Bannu confirm these gaps.

For the past four decades, the number of madrasa students in Pakistan has continued to increase but there is no policy of mainstreaming them through a single curriculum and nationally integrated educational system. When the military operations were successfully moving forward, it was incumbent upon the government to bring a robust economic reintegration programme with opportunities for livelihoods. Since these actions remained absent from the counter-terrorism strategy, the terror organisations were able to regroup and reorganise themselves in the past 2-3 years. They also took advantage of the evolving situation in Afghanistan.

In this backdrop, the counter-terrorism phase 2.0 comes with new challenges for Pakistan:

• One, the domestic political instability has continued to aggravate over the past few years and the high level of polarization would be a significant impediment to chart out a comprehensive long-term approach for combating this complex threat.
• Two, the increasing uncertainty and growing instability in Afghanistan and the linkages that the TTP has with global and regional terrorist groups present in that country considerably enhances difficulties for the counter terrorism operations inside Pakistan. So far, Pakistan’s engagement with the Afghan interim government has not led to a harmony or understanding in terms of a united action against terrorist groups affecting Pakistan, including the TTP and the Baloch militants.
• Three, the authorities will have to be prepared for dealing with serious security situations not only in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, but all over Pakistan, particularly major cities. This Friday’s terrorist incident in Islamabad claimed by the TTP underlines the challenge.
• Four, Pakistan’s economy today is in a deep crisis. While during the past two decades Pakistan had support from the donor community because of the presence of the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, currently the appetite in the international community for providing financial assistance to Pakistan has almost diminished. Even arrangements with the IMF are not getting finalized. With inflation and unemployment at unprecedented levels, meeting aspirations of the large unemployed youth is a big challenge.
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• Five, the global and regional situation today is more complex than a few years ago. The cleavages among major powers such as the United States, China and Russia are widening. In the region, India is in the grip of a rising Hindutva tide and anti-Pakistan fervor, while also being part of the anti-China Quad. The recent anti-Pakistan Indian statements indicate that the political environment in that country is not conducive towards rapprochement with Pakistan. In the past two decades, India has heavily invested in its assets to destabilize Pakistan and there is a likelihood that it would be inclined to use these assets against Pakistan, which is already facing multiple crises.

There has to be clarity that for moving forward, Pakistan has no option but to decisively and effectively counter the threat of terrorism. However, it requires a comprehensive national strategy involving planning, coordination and implementation in three crucial arms: (1) focused intelligence-based military operations; (2) political approach that should not allow existence of armed groups in violation of provisions of Pakistan’s Constitution; and (3) social and economic strategy based on economic reintegration of affected groups in the short-term and moving towards uniform education system in the country in the long-term.

In view of the cross-border movement of terrorists, resulting into the spike in terror attacks in Pakistan, cooperation of the Afghan interim government remains crucial. Towards this end, despite the current hick-ups in bilateral engagement, ways have to be found for conveying Pakistan’s relevant interests and concerns with clarity to the Afghan authorities and institutions in an effective manner.

Most importantly, the counter-terrorism strategy has to be homegrown and in sync with the country’s ground realities. Also, it has to be consistent and geared towards elimination of tendencies of radicalism and extremism. Half-hearted and short-sighted approach to counter the threat of terrorism and extremism will lead to a bigger disaster than the counter-terrorism war 1.0.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan