An Endless War

Pakistan needs a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy to beat the TTP & other violent groups

The resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threat in early 2022 will undoubtedly have serious implications for the country’s security, stability and economic paradigm. In view of the gravity of the situation, it is vital that the national counter-terrorism strategy should be reinvigorated with a comprehensive approach to effectively deal with multiple dimensions of this challenge.

The TTP threat has continued to haunt Pakistan for over 15 years now. Terrorist attacks by the TTP have resulted in the loss of lives of thousands of Pakistani citizens, and security personnel. We have been officially quoting losses exceeding $100 billion to our economy due to terrorism. Our social fabric has also been deeply affected by the continuing threat posed by the extremist armed groups.

Since 2007, when the TTP formally took shape as an entity and threatened the state and its institutions, the country has been in a constant Counter-Terrorism (CT) struggle or campaign affecting the normal working of the nation and society. Especially after 2014 attacks on a Karachi airport and then the Army Public School Peshawar, brutally killing innocent children, the state launched a massive CT initiative to eliminate the threat posed by not only from TTP but also other violent non-state actors.

But today, the threat from the TTP and its associated groups has emerged once again. This simply implies that after initial successes in operations against TTP, authorities lost focus in taking the CT initiative to its logical conclusion in recent years. The kinetic operations first undertaken through Zarb-e-Azb and then Radd-ul Fasaad initially proved successful, but later it lost the steam and direction required for concluding these initiatives. Apparently, the sleeper cells and support network of the group were not completely eliminated and during the past few years the TTP fighters have been able to regroup and reactivate themselves.

The military operations against the militant challenge always have to be supported by a political approach and effective monitoring and surveillance. The National Action Plan (NAP) had stipulated those measures which, however, were not implemented. NACTA (National Counter-Terrorism Authority) was created as an organisation to spearhead the CT efforts ensuring supervision of the LEAs and coordination between centre and provinces and between the military and the civilian CT arms. However, NACTA has not been able to develop and evolve as an effective national body because the successive governments never made it their priority. More sensitive and longer term measures, including evolving a uniform education system and syllabus, and mainstreaming of the religious seminaries under state control have not even been touched upon.

Now as Pakistan is compelled to launch a new CT initiative against the TTP, it is important to learn the lessons from the past. This time around, the CT operations have to be taken to a final outcome including the elimination of terrorism and combating the factors that lead to an environment that promotes or supports terrorism and extremism. Also, in view of the cross-border dimensions of the TTP threat, close engagement with the Afghan Interim Government is crucial.

In view of the foregoing, the CT effort has to be planned, organised and implemented in a diligent manner. The TTP through its statements, actions and demands has proved that it is an anti-state terrorist group with an agenda to destabilize Pakistan. Its recent statements in particular are not just provocative, but have crossed all the red lines. Therefore, intelligence-based operations by Pakistan’s security forces to target the TTP commanders, fighters and camps inside Pakistan’s territory, particularly in the provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan are a must. But the authorities have also to be mindful that the TTP has shown in recent years that its reach is not just confined to these two provinces, but it also threatens peace and security of capital Islamabad or urban and rural centers in the other provinces as well.

The kinetic operations inside Pakistan’s territory have to be fully supported by an approach involving coordination between central and provincial governments and the military and the civilian institutions for follow-up political and economic measures. According to the official data, the TTP has several thousand fighters and supporters. A decisive military action, therefore, will have to be supported by policies of mainstreaming and economic re-integration for those, who surrender and willing to live peacefully, recognising the supremacy of Pakistan’s Constitution and the law. Without such an approach there would be again a chance that many TTP elements go into hiding or sleeper mode to re-emerge as an active threat again in another few years.

The other dimension of cross-border linkages of the TTP with Afghanistan has to be handled even more delicately because of implications for our overall bilateral relations. The TTP commanders have been present in Afghanistan’s provinces, bordering Pakistan for years due to their Pushtoon tribal connections. During previous regimes, the Afghan intelligence NDS provided financial and logistical support to these elements with the Indian backing. Many TTP commanders also established linkages with Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan for supporting their struggle against US-led NATO forces.

Political and institutional engagement with Afghanistan is important. Our clear message to the Afghan Taliban should be that while dialogue with the TTP was undertaken at Afghan Taliban’s advice, the group has not shown commitment towards peaceful return to Pakistani society within the constitutional framework and despite ceasefire, they continued their terrorist acts. The Afghan interim government should also be sensitized that the demands of the TTP such as weaponized presence, imposition of Shariah rule according to their interpretation and reversing the merger of FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) cannot be conceded by the state of Pakistan.

Kabul should be asked to fulfill its commitment under the Doha Peace Agreement that Afghan soil will not be allowed to be used for violence and terrorism against any country. This commitment has also been reiterated bilaterally to Pakistan by the Afghan Taliban leadership multiple times. Now is the time that this commitment has to be practically fulfilled as it has been established beyond doubt that the TTP commanders and their followers are using the Afghan soil against Pakistan. Institutional engagement would provide an opportunity for devising a coordinated approach and operational details with regard to eliminating the TTP threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan. Kabul’s cooperation with Pakistan in counter-terrorism efforts is in mutual interest as Afghanistan itself is becoming a hotbed of terrorism with the presence of ISKP, Al-Qaeda, TTP, ETIM, IMU and Baloch dissidents.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have multifaceted relations through people-to-people movement, trade, transit and economic cooperation and future potential for trans-Afghan regional infrastructure and energy connectivity. It is important to sensitize that the relationship with Afghanistan should not be seen exclusively through the prism of terrorism, but as the one between the two brotherly neighbours with overlapping mutual interests.  With such an approach, there is a better chance of the Afghan government responding positively to Pakistan for addressing the TTP challenge.

We should be cognizant that for almost the past two decades, Pakistan has suffered from the wave of terrorism. We have been in the CT offensives for years. Due to gaps in our CT approach, terrorists rebound after every few years in one form or the other. Hopefully this time round, our authorities would focus on comprehensively addressing the issue to permanently eliminate this threat in a systematic manner.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan